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ABSTRACT 
One of the greatest dangers the United States faces in the 21st century is the 
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a terrorist organization.  The 
U.S. plan to combat WMD relies on both counterproliferation and nonproliferation 
activities.  Since transnational terrorist groups operate across numerous states, these 
efforts require a broad multilateral effort to be successful.  Therefore, there is a strong 
incentive to increase global participation in nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
activities.  Understanding the conditions under which states will participate in these 
endeavors is vital to expanding state participation and denying terrorist access to WMD.   
This thesis used both statistical and case study analysis to examine five variables 
which might positively influence international cooperation in the following 
nonproliferation/counterproliferation activities: the Proliferation Security Initiative, the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.  The 
five variables were security assistance, alliances, international organizations, domestic 
politics, and economic freedom.  The findings supported the importance of international 
institutions and the role domestic politics play in a state’s decision to cooperate.  In order 
to increase international cooperation in these programs, the U.S. should formally link the 
programs to an international organization and invest more resources in positively 
influencing foreign domestic populations. 
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A. PURPOSE  
  The purpose of this thesis is to study why states increase their participation in 
international nonproliferation activities.  In particular, it examines under what conditions 
states will participate in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  This thesis 
will use statistical analysis to examine cooperation across 46 states and use case studies 
to look in-depth at the governments of Russia, China, and India to determine why states 
participate in cooperative nonproliferation activities or decide not to.  Although this 
thesis will not provide a definitive solution to why states increase participation in 
cooperative nonproliferation activities, it will provide a foundation for determining what 
conditions make cooperation more likely. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a policy objective of the 
United States since the atom bomb was first created in 1945.  However, the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11 highlighted an emerging transnational terrorist threat intent on causing 
mass casualties and gave a new focus to U.S. nonproliferation policy.  Whereas prior to 
9/11, the United States was primarily concerned about the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) to other nations, the new concern was the potential use of WMD by a 
terrorist group.  A report by the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center 
cautioned, “Al Qaeda and affiliated groups continue to enhance their capabilities to 
conduct effective mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
attacks and that Al Qaeda possesses al least a crude capability to use CBRN weapons.”1  
President George W. Bush further emphasized this threat by stating: 
                                                 
1 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Prospective,” in Homeland Security and Terrorism, 
ed. Russell Howard et al (New York: McGraw-Hill 2006), 31. 
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The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism 
and technology.  Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 
weapons of mass destruction and evidence indicates that they are doing so 
with determination.2  
The U.S. plan to combat WMD relies on three pillars: counterproliferation, 
nonproliferation, and consequence management.3  This thesis studies CTR and the GTRI 
as methods of nonproliferation and the PSI as a method of counterproliferation.   Since 
transnational terrorist groups operate across numerous states, the first two pillars require 
a broad multilateral effort to be successful.  Therefore, there is a strong incentive to 
increase global participation in nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities.  
Understanding the conditions under which states will participate in these endeavors is 
vital to expanding participation and denying terrorist access to WMD.  After analyzing 
these conditions, this thesis will provide recommendations on strategies the U.S. can use 
to increase participation. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis builds on two bodies of academic literature.  The first body of 
literature encompasses nonproliferation and, more specifically, the body of literature 
pertaining to CTR, GTRI, and PSI.  The second body of literature this thesis addresses is 
international relations (IR), particularly with respect to security and cooperation.   
1. Survey of Prior CTR Studies 
The CTR program was created to assist the former Soviet Union states in 
dismantling their nuclear weapons and delivery systems, securing their nuclear warheads 
and fissile material, and converting defense industries to civilian use.  The program also 
includes projects to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles and secure chemical and 
biological weapon storage sites.  There has been a steady stream of literature written on 
the CTR program over the last 10 years.  The vast majority of the literature agrees that 
                                                 
2 “National Security Strategy for the United States,” National Security Council, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, last accessed October 2007, Introduction. 
3 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” U.S. State Department, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf, last accessed October 2007, 5. 
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the CTR program has been successful in reducing the proliferation threat to U.S. national 
security.4  The supporters of the program highlight the many successes experienced to 
date.  These include:  
6883 nuclear warheads deactivated, 80% of Russian nuclear storage sites 
have been secured, 260 tons of fissile materials have been isolated, 275 
metric tons of highly enriched uranium have been rendered useless for 
weapons, 35% of Russian chemical weapon sites have received security 
upgrades, 80 strategic border crossings have been outfitted with radiation 
detection equipment, and 58,000 former weapons scientists and engineers 
redirected to peaceful research.5   
Other, more nebulous benefits include increased diplomatic cooperation and goodwill 
between countries.   However, the detractors point to the lack of verifiable results and the 
use of funds for projects that do not directly increase U.S. national security.6   
Another area of debate involves the merits of expanding the CTR program to 
additional countries versus continuing to use all of the funds in the former Soviet Union 
states.  One argument is for the use of all the CTR funds in Russia where the majority of 
the world’s WMD and fissile material now reside.  On the other hand, the majority argues 
that the terrorist threat requires expansion of the CTR program to additional countries.7  
                                                 
4 Sharon Squassoni, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options (CRS Report for 
Congress, October 2006); Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second 
Decade (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory 
Council, 2002); Robert J. Einhorn and Michele A. Flournoy, Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Press, 2003); William J. Durch, Twenty-First Century Threat Reduction: Nuclear 
Study Results (Advanced Systems Concepts report, 30 Nov, 2001); Lewis A. Dunn et al, An Assessment of 
Preventative Threat Reduction (Science Applications International Corp report, Febuary 2001). 
5 “The Nonproliferation Scorecard: Highlights,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, 
www.stimson.org/ctr/?sn=ct20050308789, last accessed June 2007. 
6 Rich Kelly, The Nunn-Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion (CATO Institute, 18 Mar 
1996), http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-039.htm, last accessed June 2007; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DoD has improved its Management and Internal 
Controls, but Challenges Remain, June 2005, report GAO-05-329, 23. 
7 A Study for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office: The future 
of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (DFI International/Sparta inc., March 2001); William J. 
Durch, Twenty-First Century Threat Reduction: Nuclear Study Results (Advanced Systems Concepts 
report, Nov 2001); Sharon Squassoni, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options 
(CRS Report for Congress, October 2006). 
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2. Survey of Prior GTRI Studies  
While the pentagon-led CTR program focuses on threat reduction at military sites, 
the Department of Energy-led GTRI was established in 2004 to recover and secure fissile 
material (highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium) at civilian sites.  The majority 
of the literature agrees that removing nuclear material, converting HEU reactors to low 
enriched uranium (LEU) reactors, and improving security at sites that cannot be 
converted are worthy efforts to keep highly dangerous material out of the hands of 
terrorists.8  The dissent with these programs comes not from their applicability to 
reducing the threat but over the lack of funding and focused diplomacy, extended time-
tables, and deficiency of personnel.9 
3. Survey of Prior PSI Studies 
The Proliferation Security Initiative was proposed by President Bush in 2003.  
The PSI is an agreement between like-minded countries to prevent the shipment of 
WMD, related material, and their delivery systems. It is an activity, not an organization, 
which focuses a state’s attention on the problem of WMD proliferation and the practical 
aspects involved in conducting a successful interdiction.  Since its inception, the PSI has 
garnered the support of over 80 countries and generated a fair amount of controversy.  
The majority of the literature praises the PSI as an innovative and flexible framework for 
conducting interdiction efforts against the evolving threat from highly adaptable, 
transnational terrorist organizations.  However, the majority of the literature also points 
out the many problems associated with the initiative, ranging from the legal right to board 
vessels in international waters to the pitfalls of having no permanent organization or 
                                                 
8 Alexander Glasser and Frank von Hippel, “Global Cleanout: Reducing the Threat of HEU-fueled 
Nuclear Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, Jan/Feb 2006, 18; Paul Longsworth, National Nuclear Security 
Administration Statement to House Committee on Energy and Commerce, (Washington D.C.: May 2005); 
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006 (John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, July 2006); George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear 
Compliance (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).   
9 Glasser, “Global Cleanout: Reducing the Threat of HEU-fueled Nuclear Terrorism;” Bunn, Securing 
the Bomb 2006; Perkovich, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Compliance. 
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budget.10 While there has been much written on the successes and failures of the CTR 
program, GTRI and the PSI, there has been little attention given to the specific conditions 
which precipitate participation in these programs by individual states.  Knowing the 
conditions will enable the U.S. to employ appropriate strategies to maximize participation 
in these efforts and improve the chances of preventing terrorist access to WMD.   
4. Survey of Prior Research on International Cooperation 
There have been many theories put forth over the past 30 years on why states 
cooperate.  Of these,  
Liberalism and realism are the two bodies of theory which hold places of 
privilege on the theoretical menu of international relations. Most of the 
great intellectual battles among international relations scholars take place 
either across the divide between realism and liberalism, or within those 
paradigms.11  
 Realism can further be divided into offensive and defensive realism.   
a. International System Theory 
Offensive realism, championed by Mearsheimer,12 argues that all states 
strive to maximize their relative power and that the international system creates 
incentives for states to expand their power when the benefits outweigh the costs.  
Cooperation under this theory can be explained by one state using its power to impose its 
will on another state.  One of the primary methods states use to impose their will is issue 
linkage.  Hegemonic powers can tie access to natural resources, financial capital, or 
security assistance to political or economic cooperation.13  Defensive realism, as defined 
                                                 
10 Joel Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a new International Norm,” 
Naval War College Review (Spring 2006); Sharon Squassoni, Proliferation Security Initiative (CRS Report 
for Congress, Sep 2006); Mark Shulman, The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New paradigm for 
Peace and Security (April 2006), www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, last accessed July 2007; Mark 
Valencia, Proliferation Security Initiative: Making Waves in Asia (Adelphia, 2005). 
11 John Mearsheimer, “Liberal talk, realist thinking,” University of Chicago Magazine 94, no. 5 
(February, 2002), http://magazine.uchicago.edu/0202/features/index.htm, last accessed July 2007. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
144-145. 
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by Waltz,14 argues that states should pursue only moderate increases in power because 
large increases in power will result in states joining forces to “balance” against the side 
that is increasing its power.  This balancing will often leave the state worse off than 
before it gained the additional power.  Thus, the international system encourages states to 
maintain the current balance of power.  In this system, cooperation would most often 
occur along the lines of an alliance.   
Contrary to realism, liberalism argues that state preferences, instead of 
state capabilities, have the greatest influence on state actions.  Preferences will vary from 
state to state and are shaped by such factors as culture, economic system, and type of 
government.  The differences in these factors will form a set of state preferences that 
ultimately determine the state’s behavior.15  Many states share similar factors and 
liberalists would contend cooperation takes place because states want to cooperate on 
common interests.  Nye further describes the factors of culture, values, and foreign policy 
as soft power.  He believes soft power gives a state the ability to get what it wants 
through attraction rather than coercion or payment and is an important tool to gain 
international cooperation.16 
Neoliberalism (also called neoliberal institutionalism) emphasizes the 
multifaceted interdependence among countries and the importance of international 
regimes.  It emphasizes how reciprocity can encourage mutual cooperation in situations 
of continuing interaction.17  Keohane argues that regimes, by linking issues together, 
create situations in which cooperation may be rational.  The long-term benefits of 
cooperation will outweigh the short-term benefit of defection.  “Social pressure, 
exercised through linkage among issues, provides the most compelling set of reasons for 
                                                 
14 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 102-110. 
15 John Mearsheimer, “Liberal talk, realist thinking,” University of Chicago Magazine 94, no. 5 
(February, 2002), http://magazine.uchicago.edu/0202/features/index.htm, last accessed Jul 2007; Andrew 
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics: Erratum,” 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 1. (Winter, 1998). 
16 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 
2004):256-261. 
17 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).  
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governments to comply with their commitments.”18 In other words, states will follow the 
rules because if they fail to do so, other states will observe their behavior and may 
retaliate.  Similarly, Oye claims that mutuality of interest and the shadow of the future are 
two dimensions that help us understand cooperation.  In his argument, international 
regimes play an important role in maintaining standards, providing collective 
enforcement, and linking the future with the present.19  In this theory, cooperation would 
be greatest when states are significantly involved with international institutions. 
b. Subnational Theory 
While realism and liberalism explain cooperation from the system level, 
several theories of international relations go to the subnational level.  Solingen argues 
that political elites form domestic coalitions across different constituencies and the grand 
strategies of coalitions explain cooperation.  Of the three types of 
coalitions−internationalizing, backlash, and hybrid−internationalist coalitions value 
regional stability, foreign investment, international trade, and arms control and are more 
receptive to great power inducements than other types of coalitions.20  In another 
subnational theory, Putnam explains that international negotiations are a two-level game 
where at “the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups.”21  At the international level, governments seek to satisfy 
domestic pressures while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign policy.22  In 
Putnam’s theory, cooperation occurs because two leaders are able to agree on a foreign 
 
                                                 
18 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 103-104. 
19 Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 9-16. 
20 Etel Solingen, “Internationalization, Coalitions, and Regional Conflict and Cooperation,” Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict, ed. Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2003), 62-68. 
21 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” Double-
Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, ed. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and 
Robert Putnam (University of California Press, 1993), 437-445. 
22 Ibid. 
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policy course that satisfies both of their respective domestic coalitions.  In this theory, 
cooperation occurs when domestic political elites and interest groups support 
international engagement.  
D. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
Although a fair amount of literature has addressed both nonproliferation and 
international cooperation, there is a gap in the knowledge where these two bodies 
intersect.  Neither the literature on nonproliferation nor the theories proposing 
explanations for cooperation address the conditions under which states participate in 
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation activities. 
This thesis addresses the questions: “Under what conditions will states cooperate 
in threat reduction activities?” and “Under what conditions will states cooperate in the 
PSI?”  This thesis assumes U.S. support for threat reduction and WMD interdiction 
activities and will focus mainly on the factors influencing a foreign state’s decision to 
cooperate with the U.S.  All of the theories on cooperation discussed earlier can be 
correct in different situations.  Lisa Martin noted that:  
In order to understand the problem of cooperation among states, we have 
to acknowledge that international politics creates a wide range of 
cooperation problems and that explanations of how states cooperate will 
vary, depending on specific sets of interests.23   
Narrowing the focus of international cooperation down to threat reduction and 
interdiction and drawing on the literature, two sets of variables can be proposed to 
help us understand when states will cooperate.  One set of variables encompasses 
the external factors and the second focuses on the subnational factors.   
1. International-Level Independent Variables 
The international-level independent variables (IVs) are security assistance, 
alliances, and participation in international regimes.  One theory of cooperation proposes 
the powerful states use issue linkage to obtain cooperation from weaker states.  More 
                                                 
23 Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 30. 
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specifically, Gilpin argues that powerful states use security assistance as a link to obtain 
cooperation.  Since “nonproliferation issues are ‘at the very heart’ of U.S. foreign 
policy,”24 we would expect the U.S. to link security assistance to nonproliferation 
cooperation.  Thus, higher levels of cooperation should occur among states receiving 
security assistance.  The IV “security assistance” comprises the total dollar value, in 
2006, of “peace and security” assistance, foreign military sales (FMS), and commercial 
exports approved under the Arms Export Control Act.    
The realists supporting balance of power theory would expect to see states 
forming alliances and displaying the greatest amount of cooperation within those 
alliances.25  Applying this theory, we would expect to see states cooperating with U.S. 
nonproliferation initiatives if they are in a defensive alliance with the U.S.  The IV 
“alliances” will be a dichotomous variable signifying a defense alliance with the U.S.  A 
defense alliance is considered to exist if a state has signed a formal defense agreement 
with the U.S., such as participation in NATO, or allowed the U.S. to base forces in their 
country.  Conversely, since the current nonproliferation policies focus their greatest 
attention on “states of concern,” we would expect to see the least amount of cooperation 
from major states allied with countries designated as sponsors of terrorism.  The current 
list includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism.26  
The last international-level IV measures participation in international 
organizations.  Theory suggests that international organizations assist in linking issues 
and connecting the present with the future.  States with heavy participation in 
international organizations should be more susceptible to issue linkage than states with 
little international participation.  Additionally, states with heavy international 
participation should conform more closely with widely held norms.  Since there is 
currently a strong international norm against the proliferation of WMD, we would expect 
greater cooperation from states participating in international organizations.  This variable 
                                                 
24 Stephen Kaufman, “State Dept.: U.S. Officials Seek Stronger Relations with Argentina,” US Fed 
News (HT Media Ltd, 15 Feb 2007), 2. 
25 Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19 
(Winter, 1994): 50. 
26 U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 (Washington, Apr 2007), 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/, last accessed October 2007, 145-149. 
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will measure state participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), World Health Organization (WHO), Nuclear 
Supplier Group (NSG), Wassenaar arrangement (WA), Australia Group (AG), and the 
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC).  These 
organizations were selected as a representative sample of international economic and 
nonproliferation-related organizations.    
2. Subnational-Level Independent Variables 
The subnational factors examined are domestic politics and the economy.  The 
subnational IR theory suggests international cooperation relies on favorable domestic 
coalitions which are a combination of political elites, public opinion, and interest groups.  
The IV “domestic politics” will examine the opinion and attitude of foreign political 
elites and the foreign public toward the U.S. and nonproliferation in the case study 
countries.  The IV “economy” will estimate the influence of economic interest groups 
using the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom.27  This index measures 10 economic 
freedoms including business freedom, trade freedom, and investment freedom.  States 
with high economic freedom scores should have more influential economic interest 
groups and will more closely resemble an internationalist coalition as defined by 
Solingen.  We would expect the likelihood of cooperation to increase as the Economic 
Freedom score increases.    
The IVs presented in this section form the basis for the following hypotheses 
which will be tested in this thesis: 
• States are more likely to participate in a cooperative nonproliferation agreement if 
they receive U.S. security assistance. 
• States are more likely to participate in a cooperative nonproliferation agreement if 
they are a defensive ally with the U.S. 
• The likelihood of states participating in a cooperative nonproliferation agreement will 
increase as their activity in the international community increases. 
                                                 
27 Produced by the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal and found at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/, last accessed September 2007. 
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• States are more likely to participate in a cooperative nonproliferation agreement if 
their domestic political elites and public favor the U.S. and nonproliferation. 
• The likelihood of states participating in a cooperative nonproliferation agreement will 
increase as their Economic Freedom score increases.  
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
1. Statistical Analysis  
This thesis studies international cooperation in nonproliferation activities.  The 
analysis is organized in two sections.  The first section draws upon the international 
relations literature to postulate several hypotheses.  These hypotheses are then tested 
against a group of 46 states that play a significant role in nonproliferation.  The states 
include the 14 states with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons programs (China, 
Russia, U.K., France, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Iran, Egypt, Syria, South 
Korea*, Libya*, Albania*),28 the five states with suspected chemical weapons programs 
(Ethiopia, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam)29 and the 27 states with the 
potential ability to develop nuclear weapons (Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine).30  
This thesis will analyze the hypotheses using the logistic regression model, once 
for GTRI activities and a second time for PSI support.  The dependent variable (DV) will 
be the state’s participation in the nonproliferation activity (yes/no).  
 
                                                 
28 Joseph Cirincione et al, Deadly Arsenals (Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 22.  Countries with a * 
represent countries with a chemical weapons program in the process of elimination under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. 
29 Ibid., 81. 
30 Ibid., 55. 
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Figure 1.  The World’s Proliferation Status, from Deadly Arsenals31            
  
2. Case Studies 
While the statistical analysis will give us insight into the general importance of 
the IVs across a large number of states, it will not address the deeper political motivations 
involved in a decision to cooperate.  The role of political elites, specific interests groups, 
and the public can only be understood through process tracing the political practices in 
several case studies.  Therefore, the second section of this thesis examines the political 
process of three states−Russia, China, and India−with respect to nonproliferation 
activities over the past five years.  These states were chosen because their diverse levels 
of participation and government types will provide useful insight into the conditions 
                                                 
31 Joseph Cirincione et al, Deadly Arsenals (Brookings Institution Press, 2005), appendix. 
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leading to cooperation and because of their important role in regional or international 
politics.  Of the three states, Russia has fully participated in the CTR, GTRI, and PSI, 
while China and India have only participated in GTRI.  Each state has a different type of 
government with Russia having a partly democratized federation with increasing 
authoritarian elements, China a communist state, and India a democracy.32   
F. CONCLUSION 
 In the globalized world of the 21st century, transnational organizations operate 
without regard to international borders.  Terrorist organizations are no exception as the 
attacks of September 11th, 2001, have shown.  No country, even one as powerful as the 
United States, can combat the threat of transnational terrorist groups alone.  As these 
groups recruit, plan, train, and attack in multiple countries, it requires the intelligence 
assets, operational forces, and legal powers of multiple governments to effectively track 
and defeat them.  The possible use of WMD raises the stakes for all involved and makes 
countering that threat a top U.S. national security objective.  Only through increased 
international cooperation can the U.S. expand critical programs to dismantle, secure, and 
interdict WMD and related material around the globe.  As Chapter II of this thesis will 
show, the U.S. has worked to expand the CTR, GTRI, and PSI programs.  However, 
additional expansion is vital to U.S. national security.  Chapters III and IV of this thesis 
focus on examining the conditions that make cooperation more likely.  As summarized in 
Chapter V, the research shows that international organizations and domestic politics are 
the two variables that most influence cooperation in nonproliferation activities.  
Recommendations in the chapter focus on increasing the role of international 
organizations and on methods to positively influence domestic elites, interest groups, and 




                                                 
32 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book (Washington, 2007), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, last accessed August 2007. 
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The development and advancement of nonproliferation programs is one element 
of the overall U.S. national strategy to combat WMD.  There are many avenues the U.S 
uses to promote nonproliferation.  These include bilateral arms control treaties (Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty), participation in global treaties (Nonproliferation Treaty), 
development of export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group), and more recently, the 
use of threat reduction programs (Cooperative Threat Reduction and Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative).  This thesis focuses on threat reduction as a means of 
nonproliferation.  The key concept behind CTR and GTRI is to cut off access to WMD 
and fissile material at the source.  It is much more cost effective to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring WMD and fissile material in the first place than it is to try and protect all 
possible targets from a WMD attack.   
A second element of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD is counterproliferation.  If 
a terrorist organization or rogue government manages to acquire WMD or related 
material, counterproliferation operations would include efforts to interdict the weapons or 
material prior to it reaching its final destination.  This thesis examines the PSI as the main 
instrument for counterproliferation interdictions.  This chapter looks at the history of 
CTR, GTRI, and PSI to establish a foundation for determining the conditions under 
which states cooperate in these programs.  
B. HISTORY OF CTR 
In 1991, the Soviet Threat Reduction Act was passed by the U.S. congress as an 
initiative to assist the Soviets with their part of the START reductions.  However, the 
official break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 raised serious issues of security 
and accountability of nuclear weapons and material in the states that comprised the 
former Soviet Union.  Analyzing the potential effects of a break-up, many members of 
congress became concerned that the economic conditions in these states further enhanced 
the risk of nuclear proliferation.  The threat existed of “an exodus of underpaid and/or 
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unemployed nuclear weapons specialists.  Literally, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of 
scientists and engineers with experience in the design and manufacture of nuclear 
weapons and related technology worked in the huge Soviet nuclear weapons complex.”33  
In October of 1993, the Soviet Threat Reduction Act of 1991 was expanded and 
transformed, by sponsoring Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), into 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993.34  Also known as the Nunn-Lugar 
legislation, the Act was designed to aid in the storage, protection, and destruction of 
WMD in the former states of the Soviet Union.35 This act authorized threat reduction 
activities in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which were the four countries that 
inherited the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal. 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) was the lead agency charged with 
implementing CTR programs.  The DoD divided these projects into three categories:  
Destruction and dismantlement−projects designed to help with the 
elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery 
vehicles; chain of custody−projects designed to enhance the safety, 
security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials; and 
demilitarization−projects encouraging countries to convert military efforts 
to peaceful purposes.36   
Since the mid-1990s, the responsibilities for Nunn-Lugar legislation have expanded to 
include the Department of Energy (DOE) and the State Department.  Each of these 
agencies brought additional funding and expertise to augment the initial CTR program.  
The DOE has taken on the lead role in securing nuclear weapon storage sites and in 
improving fissile material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) procedures at 
nuclear facilities.  The State Department is primarily concerned with strengthening export 
controls, regulating dual use technologies, and providing commercial opportunities to 
former weapon scientists and engineers.  
                                                 
33 William C. Potter & John M. Shields, “Assessing the Dismantlement Process,” Dismantling the 
Cold War, ed. William C. Potter & John M. Shields (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 4.  
34 Dunbar Lockwood, “The Nunn-Lugar program: No time to pull the plug,” Arms Control Today, 
Washington, June 1995, Vol. 25, Iss. 5: 8. 
35 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm, last accessed March 2007. 
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1. CTR Successes 
The CTR program has recorded many successes since its inception.  Programs to 
consolidate the Soviet nuclear arsenal in Russia concluded with great accomplishment 
when Kazakhstan, followed by the Ukraine and then Belarus became non-nuclear 
weapons states.  In December 2003, after 7 years of construction, the Mayak fissile 
material storage facility was completed.  This facility will allow Russia to securely store 
25 metric tons of plutonium.37  In 2006, the U.S. and Russia signed an agreement 
extending the CTR umbrella agreement for an additional seven years.  The overarching 
umbrella agreement provides a critical legal mechanism for the U.S. government and 
contractors to work in the host country.  The umbrella agreement provides a framework 
for negotiating the practical problems, such as security clearances, encountered when 
implementing a program of this nature.  There have been numerous other projects that 
have dismantled or secured Russian WMD and employed Russian scientists.  Lisa 
Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and 
Counterproliferation, stated: 
Of the 62 CTR program areas Congress has funded since the program’s 
inception, 51 of those areas are now complete. This reflects the large 
amount of former Soviet nuclear weapons inventory and infrastructures 
that CTR has helped eliminate or secure.38 
All of these projects have contributed to nonproliferation and improved the security of 
the United States. 
2. CTR Problems  
Despite the many successes, there have also been cases of failure.  The major 
problem the CTR initiative has encountered is periodic lack of cooperation from host 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Amy F. Wolf, “Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events” (CRS 
Report for Congress, January 2005), 23.  
37 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Fact Sheet,” 
http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs=ctr, last accessed June 2007. 
38 Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and 
counterproliferation, testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2004, http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/March/Bronson.pdf, last accessed October 2007. 
 18
nations.  This can come in the form of a failure to honor commitments, of security 
concerns, or of lack of political coordination and communication.  Two examples of a 
lack of honoring commitments occurred when the Russian government failed to fund 
various parts of CTR projects.  The Russian government paid neither its share of the $275 
million required to fund the nuclear storage site at Mayak nor the upkeep costs of newly 
installed security equipment.39  Another cooperation problem is the host nation desire for 
secrecy.  There are some facilities in Russia that U.S. inspectors are not allowed to visit.  
One of the earliest criticisms of the CTR program was the funding of CTR projects at 
sites where the Russians did not allow inspectors access.  This prevented the U.S. from 
obtaining objective evidence that the CTR money spent had the desired benefit 
accomplished.  Later revisions of legislation mandated inspection and accountability as 
criteria for project funding.  These new requirements have slowed the implementation of 
CTR upgrades to remaining Russian facilities.   
The remaining work will be very difficult because greater cooperation and 
trust are required to extend the program to the more sensitive facilities 
with large amounts of fissile material.  Also, U.S. demands for strict 
accountability regarding expenditures of U.S. funds naturally conflict with 
strict Russian secrecy requirements.40   
Two of the biggest CTR failures have occurred due to lack of communication and 
political coordination within the host government.  The CTR program spent $106 million 
designing and building a liquid propellant (heptyl) disposition plant only to find out 
Russia had already used the liquid propellant in its commercial space launch program.  In 
another example, the CTR program spent $100 million in design and initial construction 
of a solid rocket fuel elimination facility near the city of Votkinsk.  The entire project 
was shut down after further construction was abruptly blocked by local Russian 
authorities.41   
                                                 
39 Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, United States General Accounting 
Office, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar 5, 2003, 
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d03526t.html, last accessed July 2007.  
40 Siegfried S. Hecker. “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia,” 
The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2001): 8.  
41 Bronson, testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 10, 2004. 
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3. CTR Solutions 
In an effort to address some of these criticisms and reduce the risk that projects 
will not meet national security objectives, the DoD has increased oversight staffing at the 
OSD level and implemented program manager training for those involved in managing 
the cost, schedule, and performance aspects of CTR projects.42  A review board has been 
established to assess risks for a given project prior to implementation.  Projects have also 
been broken down into three phases: development, execution, and maintenance.  Each 
phase has clear entry and exit requirements which must be fulfilled prior to transitioning 
to the next phase of the project.  According to a GAO report, “These improved controls 
cannot eliminate the risks inherent in the program, but the goal is to mitigate risk to an 
appropriate level given the circumstances.”43  In an attempt to prevent major project 
losses of the “heptyl” variety, the CTR program has increased the use of signed legal 
documents from high level officials.  Large projects now require signature at the Russian 
Ministry of Defense level before moving forward.  
4. Expanding the CTR Program 
In 2004, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act.  This act gives the 
DoD the authority to use CTR funds outside of the former Soviet Union states.  In 
addressing Congress, Senator Lugar stated: 
The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated 
that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary 
outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 
1980s that American contractors and DoD officials would be on the 
ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to 
protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create 
new nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any 
nonproliferation opportunities that appear.44  
                                                 
42 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Cooperative Threat Reduction: DoD has improved its 
Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain,” Report to Congressional Committees, June 
2005, report GAO-05-329, 12. 
43 Ibid 23. 
44 Senator Richard Lugar, Statements on introduced bills, Congressional Record: March 18, 2002, 
www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/s031802.html, last accessed June 2007. 
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There are numerous candidates for CTR expansion.  The following countries have 
a suspected or confirmed nuclear weapons, biological weapons, or chemical weapons 
capability and have terrorist activity within their country: Algeria, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Yugoslavia.45  Although global 
terrorists will seek WMD from any state, the countries with both nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons capability and regular terrorist activity within their border represent 
an especially high risk.   
5. Obstacles to CTR Expansion 
In principle, the CTR program, after 15 years of developing experienced 
government personnel and contractors, lessons learned, and proven processes, could be 
exported to any other country.  In realistic terms, there are political and legal constraints 
that need to be overcome prior to expanding the program.  One requirement is the need 
for transparency, which is based on the principle of trust.  Transparency requires the host 
nation to allow technicians, inspectors, and auditors into highly sensitive facilities to 
implement CTR measures and ensure CTR funds are being spent appropriately.  It is 
highly unlikely, given the adversarial relationship that has developed between the U.S. 
and Iran or North Korea, that either nation would be amenable to opening up its most 
sensitive military sites to U.S. inspection.  These countries are too worried about a U.S. 
military strike to share detailed knowledge concerning their nuclear programs.  However, 
a third country, such as Russia or China, or an international organization, like the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), might be more successful establishing a 
relationship of trust with one of these countries and could play the lead role in any CTR-
type efforts.  The U.S. could form a partnership with the lead party and provide process 
knowledge and some of the funding required to implement CTR programs.  In this 
manner, a country like Iran, which already purchases military hardware from Russia, 
could agree to enter into a CTR agreement with Russia.  Iran would grant Russia access  
 
                                                 
45 Sharon Squassoni, “Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options” (CRS Report 
for Congress, October 2006), 7. 
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to its nuclear facilities and Russia would provide the material security and accountability 
process improvements required to ensure terrorist groups do not gain access to the fissile 
material. 
Another obstacle to expanding the CTR program is legal obligations.  These can 
come in the form of international law, through treaties, or through domestic law.  The 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): 
Prohibits transferring weapons, assisting, encouraging, or inducing any 
other non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire weapons.  In 
addition, the U.S. is prohibited from helping non-nuclear weapon states46 
‘control’ nuclear devices.47   
The term control is not defined and is the issue of contention.  Some policy experts 
interpret CTR assistance in upgrading security at nuclear facilities as helping a country 
“control” their nuclear devices.  To clear this legal hurdle, the U.S. would have to either 
interpret the treaty in a defined manner, and risk possible international criticism, or work 
on updating the treaty to include India, Pakistan, and Israel.  There are also several 
domestic terrorism laws that might impede CTR assistance.  The “State Sponsors of 
Terrorism List and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 both prohibit most assistance to 
countries which support or sponsor terrorism.”48  The State Department lists Cuba, Iran, 
North Korea, Syria, and Sudan as states which sponsor terrorism.  In order for the U.S. to 
expand the CTR program into any of these five countries, the president would have to 
submit a waiver justifying the assistance as vital to U.S. national security. 
6. The Future of CTR 
The Nunn-Lugar program has grown from an initial annual funding level of 
around $400 million to the current level of approximately $1 billion annually and is 
projected to decline to approximately $350 million by 2009.49  By then, all of the large 
infrastructure projects in Russia will be complete and it is estimated funding for projects 
                                                 
46 All states except U.S., Russia, China, France, and U.K. 
47 Squassoni, “Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options,” 28. 
48 Ibid, 36. 
49 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm, last accessed March 2007. 
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outside of Russia will exceed funding for projects inside Russia for the first time.  Joseph 
Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, 
stated: 
The trend toward more CTR activity outside Russia reflects the realities of 
today.  The Russian Federation has both the revived organizational 
capability as well as the resources to secure weapons of mass destruction 
inside its borders, and President Putin has committed to doing so. Indeed, 
with narrow exceptions, we anticipate that CTR will fulfill contracts and 
commitments already made in Russia, but not undertake any new work in 
the foreseeable future.50 
The future of CTR relies on the program’s flexibility to handle new threats in 
emerging countries.  The CTR program has started a new biological security complex in 
Georgia and is negotiating a second facility in Azerbaijan.  The new facilities will 
conduct defensive research and monitor the biological weapons threats in the area.51  
Several other emerging programs deal with border security and detection of radiological 
or biological agents.  The CTR program area’s of emphasis are elimination and security, 
both important tools in the nonproliferation toolbox, and U.S. security will be improved if 
it can expand the use of these mechanisms to additional countries which possess WMD 
and related material.  The key to signing up new countries to participate in this program 
is close cooperation between states. 
C. HISTORY OF GTRI 
In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the “Atoms for Peace” 
program.  The intent of this program was to provide nuclear materials, including highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel, and technology to other countries under the 
condition that they be used for peaceful purposes and not military research.  In addition to 
the U.S., other exporters of HEU reactor fuel have included Russia, China, France, and 
                                                 
50 Joseph A. Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, April 11, 2007, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/April/Benkert%2004-11-
07.pdf, last accessed October 2007. 
51 Ibid. 
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the United Kingdom.52  Speeding ahead five decades, the HEU and plutonium used in 
civilian research reactors and for medical isotope production has become a national 
security concern.  Data collected in 2003 indicate there is:  
About 50 tons of HEU in civilian power and research programs in over 50 
nations.  Approximately 128 civilian research facilities have 20 kg or more 
of HEU stocks. Yet as little as 25 kg are needed to produce a nuclear 
weapon—some 40-60 kg are needed for a cruder nuclear device.53   
A terrorist desiring to conduct a WMD attack must first gain the material need to produce 
a nuclear weapon.   
As part of the nonproliferation strategy the U.S. is implementing to counter this 
threat, the Bush administration combined an array of separate programs into the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative in May of 2004.  Spencer Abraham, the U.S. Secretary of 
Energy in 2004, described the four goals of the program as: 
• Repatriate all Russian-origin fresh high enriched uranium fuel, and accelerate 
and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010. 
• Take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of 
all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel from existing locations, 
around the world, within a decade. 
• Work to convert the cores of civilian research reactors that use high 
enriched uranium to use low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, in the U.S. 
and around the world. 
• Work to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials 
and related equipment that are not yet covered by existing threat 
reduction efforts including HEU of non-U.S. and non-Russian-origin 
and separated plutonium.54   
                                                 
52 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Why Highly Enriched Uranium is a Threat,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/heu/index.html, last accessed July 2007. 
53 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “Why Highly Enriched Uranium is a Threat,” 
http://www.nti.org/db/heu/index.html, last accessed July 2007. 
54 Spencer Abraham, remarks at the Global Threat Reduction International Partners’ Conference, 
Vienna, Austria, September 18, 2004. 
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1. GTRI Successes 
The GTRI has had many successes in the last three years.  Under the initiative, 6 
research rectors have been converted to operate with LEU instead of HEU, 337 kilograms 
of HEU fresh fuel and 63 kilograms of HEU spent fuel have been returned to Russia, 100 
kilograms of HEU fresh fuel and 190 kilograms of HEU spent fuel have been returned to 
the U.S., and physical protection upgrades have been completed at approximately 520 
radiological sites in 40 countries.55  In order to accomplish these feats, the Department of 
Energy applies a risk-based approach to prioritize threats to the United States.  “This risk-
based approach is informed by several criteria, including, but not limited to the type and 
quantity of material, security conditions at the site, and location of material.”56  However, 
because the GTRI is a voluntary program, it relies heavily on diplomatic agreements and 
international cooperation to achieve its objectives.   
International cooperation in these efforts is so critical that the IAEA Director 
General Mohamed ElBaradei called it the hallmark of these security efforts.  He further 
added: 
While nuclear security is and should remain a national responsibility, 
many countries still lack the programs and the resources to respond 
properly to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. International 
efforts are focused on assisting these countries.57 
The aspects of international cooperation can be broken down into two important areas.  
The first is cooperation among the nuclear weapon states that originally exported the 
HEU and the second is cooperation among the many nations that posses HEU-fueled 
research reactors and others sources of HEU and plutonium. 
                                                 
55 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), “GTRI: More Than Two and a Half Successful 
Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats,” http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2007/NA-07-FS-03.pdf, last 
accessed July 2007. 
56 Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, NNSA, U.S. 
Department of Energy, Statement to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, On NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, May 24, 2005. 
57 Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, remarks at the Global Threat Reduction International Partners’ 
Conference, Vienna, Austria, September 18, 2004. 
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2. U.S. and Russia Joint Efforts 
By far the two largest exporters of HEU over the past 50 years have been the U.S. 
and Russia.  Therefore, for any global threat reduction effort to be successful, it requires 
the participation of both of these countries in the program.  In 2005, the Bratislava 
conference brought the leaders of these two nations together for a crucial meeting to 
cement cooperation on these issues.  The successful conference ended with a joint 
statement from both President Bush and President Putin pledging: 
The United States and Russia will enhance cooperation to counter one of 
the gravest threats our two countries face, nuclear terrorism.  We will 
continue to work jointly to return fresh and spent high-enriched uranium 
from U.S. and Russian-design research reactors in third countries and 
continue our cooperation on security upgrades of nuclear facilities.58 
Although not part of this conference, China, France, and the U.K. are also responsible for 
exporting small amounts of HEU to a handful of countries.  Efforts to bring them on-
board need to occur to cover all of the HEU spread around the globe.  This is important 
because the U.S. and Russian programs only take back U.S.-origin and Russian origin 
HEU respectively.  The inclusion of these other countries will also be a source of 
additional funding for the global threat reduction efforts. 
3.  Expanding the GTRI 
With the two main suppliers of HEU participating in the GTRI, the focus of 
international cooperative efforts has shifted to the states where the HEU reactors and fuel 
reside.  Table 1 details the countries currently in possession of HEU and efforts to return 
that material to the country of origin.  Although many countries are participating in “take 
back” programs, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, India, Iran, Japan, Nigeria, North Korea, 
Pakistan, and South Africa all have HEU that is not currently covered by these programs.  
While removing the HEU fuel is important, it is only one part of the problem.  The other 
dilemma concerns the reactors themselves.  The IAEA estimates, “currently about 130 
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research reactors around the world still run on weapons-grade HEU.”59  As long as these 
reactors run on HEU, they will require fresh HEU as fuel and produce spent HEU as a 
by-product.  The transportation and storage of fresh and spent HEU represents a serious 
proliferation concern.  Paul Longsworth, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, stated “a number of 
countries have not participated in GTRI programs because of concerns surrounding the 
potential economic, financial, or scientific impact of returning spent fuel or converting 
their reactor.”60  The U.S. needs to works with these states to convince them of the 
importance of converting their research reactors to LEU.  In cases where a reactor cannot 
be converted, a work-around solution needs to be found so the reactors can be shut down 
and decommissioned. 
The GTRI was created to reduce the threat of a terrorist organization obtaining the 
material required to make either a nuclear or radiological bomb.  The initiative has made 
some noteworthy achievements but much work remains to be completed.  Expanding the 
GTRI depends on the ability of the U.S. to obtain international cooperation.  Only 
through cooperative efforts will the U.S. be successful in minimizing the risk posed by 
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Country (Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States)  
Amount of HEU 
(in tonnes) Enrichment Supplier  
Involved in take-back 
program? 
Argentina  0.02 USA  Yes, to USA  
Australia  0.35 USA, UK  Yes, to USA  
Austria  0.005-0.02  USA  Yes, to USA  
Belarus  0.25-0.37  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Belgium  0.7-0.75  USA  Yes, to USA  
Brazil  0-0.001  USA, China  Yes, to USA  
Bulgaria  0.006 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Canada  1.35 USA  Yes, to USA  
Chile  0.005 USA, France  Yes, to USA  
Czech Republic  0.08-0.14  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
DPRK  0.042 Russia   No 
Georgia  0-0.001  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Germany  1.4-2.7  USA, Russia  Yes, to USA  
Ghana  0.001 China   No 
Hungary  0.15-0.25  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
India  0.005-0.01  UK   No 
Iran  0.007 USA, China  Yes, to USA  
Israel  0.034 USA  Yes, to USA  
Italy  0.1-0.2  USA  Yes, to USA  
Jamaica  0.001 USA  Yes, to USA  
Japan  2 USA, UK  Yes, to USA  
Kazakhstan  10.59-10.94 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Latvia  0.02-0.025  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Libya  0.025 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Mexico  0.012 USA  Yes, to USA  
Netherlands  0.73-0.81  USA  Yes, to USA  
Nigeria  0.001 China  No 
Norway  0.004 USA  No 
Pakistan  0.017 USA, China  Yes, to USA  
Poland  0.49 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Portugal  0.007-0.008  USA  Yes, to USA  
Rep. of Korea  0.002 USA  Yes, to USA  
Romania  0.033-0.044  Russia, USA Yes, to Russia, USA  
Serbia  0.013 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Slovenia  0-0.005  USA  Yes, to USA  
South Africa  0.61-0.76  South Africa, USA Yes, to USA  
Sweden  0.002 USA  Yes, to USA  
Switzerland  0.005-0.01  USA  Yes, to USA  
Syria  0.001 China   No 
Taiwan  0.003-0.01  USA  Yes, to USA  
Turkey  0.008 USA  Yes, to USA  
Ukraine  0.16-0.25  Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Uzbekistan  0.12 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Vietnam  0.0056 Russia  Yes, to Russia  
Table 1. Major Holders of Civil HEU, by Country (end 2003)61 
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D. HISTORY OF PSI 
 The current U.S. focus on WMD interdiction has its roots in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy and the follow-on National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  These documents began implementing a new defensive concept known as a 
layered defense or defense in-depth.  Its general idea is that no solitary layer, or 
capability, can provide adequate security against a determined terrorist adversary.   
Our challenge then is to improve our defenses – to add new ‘layers’ – on a 
continuous basis in such a way as to defeat terrorists employing novel 
tactics or seeking to exploit previous vulnerabilities.62   
One of the layers the Bush administration has been keen on emphasizing, in addition to 
the more traditional nonproliferation tools such as the NPT and the export control 
regimes, is counterproliferation.  The premise behind this layer resides in the belief that 
either through states cheating on their NPT obligations or black market networks, it was 
inevitable that some WMD or related material would get past the first line of defense and 
into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations.  Developing the capability to 
interdict material or weapons that got by the first line of defenses would add a significant 
robustness to U.S. protection. 
 The first major test of the interdiction “layer” occurred in December 2002 when 
Spanish naval forces, working with the U.S., interdicted the So San, a North Korean ship.  
After searching the So San, Spanish forces found 15 Scud missiles which were in-route to 
Yemen.  Although initially a major operational success, the missiles were later allowed to 
be delivered because the U.S. had no legal basis for confiscating the cargo.  Less 
prominent interdictions followed including:  
In April 2003, the Australians detained the Pong Su, another North Korean 
ship, this time carrying $48 million worth of heroin. On June 22, the Baltic 
Sky was seized off the coast of Greece carrying several hundred tons of  
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explosives, which reportedly were bound for Africa. And just a few days 
later, on July 1, Spanish forces seized a ship carrying South Korean 
Daewoo rifles and 100-mm guns.63 
These interdictions are examples of the types of activities President Bush envisioned 
when he announced the PSI, in Krakow Poland, on May 31, 2003.  
 The PSI is not an organization but an activity focused around a central statement 
of purpose.  This purpose is to stop or impede the delivery of WMD and related material.  
The members of the PSI, now numbering in excess of 80 countries, all agree to support a 
common set of interdiction principles.  In essence, it is a “set of partnerships that 
establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities when the need arises.  The 
focus is to establish greater coordination among partner states and a readiness to act 
effectively when action is needed.”64  Since the creation of the PSI, the efforts of the U.S. 
have centered on increasing operational effectiveness, gaining legitimacy for WMD 
interdiction, and expanding participation.   
1. Operational Effectiveness  
The operational effectiveness of the PSI is advanced mainly through closer 
cooperation between states.  This is predominately carried out through more extensive 
intelligence sharing and operational exercises in which the military forces of several 
nations practice joint tactical interdictions.  The most critical element of the PSI is 
intelligence.  Looking for WMD shipments among the millions of tons of goods 
transported around the globe each year can be compared to the proverbial needle in a 
haystack. Good intelligence is needed to identify when, where, and how WMD or related 
materials are being transported.  Once identified, intelligence allows political leaders to 
make informed decisions on whether to commit scarce resources and political capital to 
interdict a shipment.  The key to improving our intelligence is sharing information with 
our PSI partners around the globe.   
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a. The Importance of Intelligence 
The global nature of transnational terrorist organizations makes it 
impossible for any one country, regardless of size or power, to defeat the threat.  
Terrorists are not hindered by national sovereignty and take advantage of the gaps in 
cooperation that exist between nations to elude prosecution.  In combating a transnational 
entity, intelligence needs to be gathered from many countries in order to construct a 
realistic picture of the organization.  
The international community has recognized the importance of sharing 
intelligence and has taken some steps down this road.  The G8 agreed to “pass legislation 
if necessary to ensure that terrorism information can be shared internally with police and 
prosecutors and externally with other countries.”65  However, the concern over 
compromising sources and methods often limits the extent of information sharing to a 
series of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and another country.  The U.S. has made 
important strides in sharing intelligence with international partners and a continued focus 
on intelligence sharing will increase the effectiveness of the PSI.  
b.  Operational Exercises 
Once intelligence is gathered and a decision to act has been reached, the 
forces of one or more countries must be capable of effectively interdicting sea, air, or 
land transportation while minimizing injuries or damage to the carrier and its crew.  In 
order for the forces of multiple countries to execute a complex tactical maneuver, it is 
vital they have practiced together to ensure communications and procedural obstacles 
have been overcome prior to the stress and danger of a real operation.  To this end, the 
PSI has served as the coordinating mechanism for the conduct of 28 operational exercises 
hosted by 17 different nations.66  The PSI exercises have: 
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All been publicized, with media invited to observe some of the maneuvers.  
These public displays of military and law enforcement agencies’ 
capabilities serve three purposes in support of the initiative: to build 
capability; to provide evidence to the public of a genuine political 
commitment; and to send a deterrent message to current and potential 
proliferators. At the very least, a consistent demonstration of increased 
will and capability may cause those involved in proliferation networks to 
change their patterns or to increase the money they demand from these 
transactions, making them more expensive and difficult.67 
Terrorists, in deciding whether to use WMD in an attack scenario, weigh the costs and 
benefits versus the use of more traditional weapons.  One goal of the PSI is to deter the 
proliferation of WMD by increasing the costs and thus altering the cost-benefit 
calculation.  In this manner, terrorists might be deterred from attempting to use these 
weapons. 
2. PSI Legitimacy 
 The legitimacy of the PSI, especially operations conducted on the high seas, has 
posed a daunting obstacle to the Bush administration’s desire to implement an 
interdiction policy on a global scale.  Legitimacy, as defined by the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary, refers to an action taken in accordance with the law or conforming to 
recognized principles or accepted rules and standards.68  Since the inception of the PSI, 
the U.S. has worked diligently to expand the legal authorities of the PSI and to widen 
acceptance of the principles of WMD interdiction, intending that one day, seizure of 
WMD will become an international norm.   
a. Legal Considerations 
There are two important legal conditions that need to be met to 
successfully conduct a maritime PSI operation.  The interdicting state needs to have legal 
authority to board and search a vessel and a separate legal authority to seize and capture 
the cargo.   
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There are two primary ways for a state to legally board and search a 
vessel.  The first is by enforcing its customs laws within 24 miles of its coast and the 
second is by obtaining the consent of the nation the ship is flagged under.69  One reason 
the U.S. has worked to expand the number of countries supporting the PSI is to increase 
the chances that a suspect ship will sail within a PSI partner’s 24-mile searchable vicinity 
or be the flag carrier.  Once this happens, the U.S. can work with that nation to share 
intelligence on the suspect shipment and coordinate a legal interdiction operation.  
Another method to get a ship within the 24-mile boundary, of a PSI partner state, is to get 
the owner of the ship to order that ship to dock in a certain port.  This is in fact what 
happened in the case of the BBC China, the ship interdicted in 2003 and found to be 
carrying centrifuge parts from Pakistan to Libya.  According to Stephen Rademaker, 
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. State Department: 
That ship was an Antiguan-flagged vessel, but it was owned by a German 
company. And the German government approached their citizens who 
owned the ship and asked them to direct the vessel into an Italian port, and 
Italian customs authorities then carried out the search, which discovered 
the centrifuge, which led to unraveling both of the covert Libyan nuclear 
program and the covert A.Q. Kahn nuclear proliferation network.70  
As the U.S. expands participation in the PSI, the number of ships owned by companies in 
PSI partner nations will increase and thus the likelihood of obtaining cooperation from 
that ship’s owner increases.  In 2005, 68% of all ships and 70% of dead weight tons were 
transported on ships owned by PSI-supporting states.71  
Alternatively, once consent of a flag nation has been obtained, the U.S. 
can search a ship sailing in international waters.  Many ships fly a “flag of convenience” 
for various tax, environmental, and liability reasons.  One goal of the U.S., under the PSI, 
is to sign boarding agreements with the “flag of convenience” nations.  Since 2004, the 
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U.S. has signed boarding agreements with five of the six largest “flag of convenience” 
nations.  These bilateral agreements put in place have expedited procedures to facilitate 
the boarding process.  As of 2005, 62% of ships and 68% of dead weight tons were 
transported on ships flagged by PSI supporting nations.72  Table 2 illustrates the progress 
made by the U.S. and presents opportunities for further expansion. 
Once a ship has been boarded and searched, the interdictor needs legal authority to seize 
the cargo.  The So San is an example where the Spanish authorities had the legal right to 
board the ship but did not have the legal right to confiscate the Scud missiles.  The U.S. 
relies on the NPT, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as the legal authority to seize WMD.  Joel 
Doolin, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General Corps, explains: 
Normally, a treaty binds only nations that agree to it.  However, the 
doctrine of customary international law holds that a well established and 
widespread practice is evidence of the existence of a duty binding all 
nations.73   
Since the NPT has been signed by 188 states, the BWC by 156 states, and the CWC 
signed by 182 states, this doctrine arguably grants this U.S. legal authority to seize  
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.  However, this does not give the U.S. the 
authority to seize ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. 
b. Building an International Norm 
  In addition to expanding the legal basis for PSI interdictions, the U.S. is 
working to increase the acceptance of the principle of WMD interdiction.  There are 
currently over 80 states now supporting the PSI.  As the number of states supporting the 
PSI increases, the norm of counterproliferation strengthens and comes closer to global 
acceptance.  As counterproliferation becomes the norm, it should become easier to pass 
stronger and more effective international treaties banning WMD proliferation.  Already, 
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the EU has strongly endorsed the PSI as long as it is conducted within the realm of law.  
A further move to legitimize the PSI occurred when the U.N. Security Council passed 
Resolution 1540.   
 
 Flag of 
Registry No.  DWT 
PSI 
Support
 Flag of 
Registry No.  DWT 
PSI 
Support
 Panama  
 
3,415 203,437,127 Y  India  201 
 
12,440,711 N 
 Liberia  
 
1,410 88,832,748 Y Germany 277 
 
12,147,563 Y 
 Greece  
 
555 51,899,956 Y  Italy  248 
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 Hong Kong  
 
721 48,739,763 N 
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644 46,028,621 Y  Iran  118 
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 Malta  
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 Danish 
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8,585,386 Y 
 Cyprus  
 
696 30,453,506 Y 
 St. 
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7,341,117 N 
 China  
 






370 18,883,291 Y Bermuda 85 
 
6,584,222 N 
 Isle of Man  
 








295 12,604,530 Y 
    
Table 2.  World Merchant Fleet by Top 25 Flag and Type, 200574 
 
While this resolution does not provide any enforcement authority, it does require: 
All states establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD 
and means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, including by 
establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and adopt 
legislative measures in that respect.  Further to counter that threat, it called 
upon all States, according to their national legislation and consistent with 
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international law, to cooperate in preventing illicit trafficking in such 
weapons, means of delivery and related materials.75  
Although this resolution does not specifically mention the PSI, it does go a long way 
towards establishing the illegality of trafficking in WMD and thus adds to the legitimacy 
of actions countering that traffic.   
3. Expanding PSI Support 
 The PSI started out in 2003 with 11 like-minded states that worked together to 
create the founding principles.  Initially, many states were critical of the PSI as an 
attempt by the Bush administration, notorious for its fondness for unilateral action, to 
target states of concern and to use its power to trample the sovereign rights of less 
powerful nations.  The chief concern of most states was the legality of interdicting ships 
on the high seas.  In response to this criticism, the Bush administration went to great 
lengths to assure the world that any boarding would be conducted within the realm of 
international law.  A second concern was the ambiguity of the language involved with the 
PSI principles.  The language gives the U.S. the flexibility to enforce the prohibition of 
WMD trafficking when it desires and to ignore it when that serves the administration’s 
purpose.  This is contrary to the normal rule of law in which the law would apply equally 
to everyone.   Although the initiative does target states of concern and non-state actors, 
that has as much to do with the reality of having limited operational and intelligence 
resources, especially with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, than any desire to play 
favorites.  Unfortunately, the political realities of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
do cause the U.S. to overlook the misdeeds of several states.  Dr. Mark Shulman, Adjunct 
Professor of Law at Pace Law School, states: 
The best evidence suggests India, Pakistan, and Israel will not be targeted-
at least for now. Eventually, the PSI must develop enough support that it 
can halt proliferation from all countries, including those that are powerful 
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or that have special influence as allies in the GWOT.  Granting free passes 
runs contrary to the basic principles of the rule of law.76   
a. Engagement from the Top 
The Bush administration has made the war on terrorism the primary focus 
of U.S. foreign policy and, as one of the pillars of U.S. strategy to combat WMD, the PSI 
plays a central role.  Therefore, it is not surprising to find high-level political figures 
involved in efforts to expand the PSI.  In a 2006 speech, President Bush urged all 
responsible states to join the global effort to end the WMD proliferation trade77 and in 
2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice identified the “greatest threats of our time as 
global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”78  This high level 
of attention has paid off with the PSI growing quickly from an initial 11 states to 
approximately 60 states by the end of 2004 and over 80 states by 2007.  Even with this 
impressive growth, there are still major geographic gaps in the PSI network.  U.S. Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph stated: 
Significant percentages of global commerce transit through such key 
strategic areas as the Straits of Malacca, the Suez Canal, the Middle East 
and Gulf regions, as well as major air routes which crisscross the globe.  
The participation by these states adds an important element to our efforts 
to deny proliferators access to maritime and air routes. We continue to 
engage with states in Asia, an important region for enhancing our 
cooperation, as well as in Latin America and Africa. We should increase 
our efforts to gain more PSI partners from each of these key regions.79 
The participation of states in key geographic areas or with substantial influence in areas 
of concern, such as the Asian Pacific, is critical to making the PSI an effective tool.  
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b.  Cooperation and Coercion Mixed 
The importance of expanding support for the PSI has resulted in the U.S. 
employing issue linkage, in several cases, using both positive and negative incentives to 
bring states on-board.  The signing of boarding agreements with the flag of convenience 
states was a major goal which required the U.S. to apply significant pressure to obtain 
support.  In the case of Panama, a boarding agreement was only reached after the U.S. 
accused Panama of failing to comply with U.S. anti-terrorism measures.  Taken to the 
extreme, this could have resulted in Panamanian-flagged ships being barred from U.S. 
ports which would have significantly damaged Panama’s shipping industry and cut off a 
major source of government revenue.80  Although it is unlikely the U.S. would have fully 
carried through with this threat, even the potential loss of a significant source of income 
for a small state was enough to obtain its cooperation.  The Panamanians can now reap 
positive political benefits from the relationship with the U.S. and advertise to their ship 
owners that there is no fear of them getting shut out of American ports.  During a House 
of Representative Subcommittee meeting, Congressman Brad Sherman stated: 
I can think of no better way for a country to demonstrate friendship to the 
United States than to work with us on nonproliferation issues. Those 
countries that do should receive our gratitude, and those who hinder our 
efforts should become known to this Congress formally or informally.81   
As further evidence of using the carrot-and-stick approach to gaining PSI support, 
Congressman Sherman indicated, later in the hearing, that participation in the PSI might 
affect congressional approval of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.  When 
notified that Egypt was hindering efforts to promote the PSI at a recent conference in 
New York, he stated: 
I know that, later this year, we will have a chance to see whether we 
should reduce aid to Egypt, and that is not something I have ever been 
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willing to do before, but this is—it is very hard to frustrate our efforts here 
and then try to be the number two recipient of United States aid.82   
After Argentina expressed support for the PSI, “a top U.S. diplomat expressed optimism 
that U.S. relations with Argentina will improve ‘quite significantly’ in the coming 
months.”83  Although the U.S. does not explicitly state what positive or negative 
inducements were used to elicit support for the PSI, it can be reasoned that the U.S. often 
employs political and economic incentives to persuade states to cooperate in this 
initiative.  However, given the lack of PSI support in many key geographic areas, this 
method of extracting support is not a panacea to all the issues involved in gaining 
international cooperation in counterproliferation activities. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
A terrorist organization will not attack the strongest link in the nuclear chain but 
the weakest.  It is paramount the U.S. and its allies make a determined effort to shore up 
the security of every nuclear site in order to raise the overall security of the “weakest 
link.”  Only in this manner will terrorists be deterred or prevented from attempting to 
acquire WMD.  The CTR program and the GTRI are the means by which the U.S. plans 
to eliminate and secure both military and civilian sources of WMD and material around 
the globe.  If this nonproliferation layer fails, the U.S. plans to use the PSI to interdict the 
weapon or material before it reaches its final destination.  With WMD and related 
material in many states and with the trend for terrorist organizations to operate globally, 
the need for international cooperation to counter the terrorist WMD threat has never been 
greater.  Chapters III and IV of this thesis will examine the conditions under which states 
cooperate.  Chapter V will make recommendations on methods the U.S. can use to 
increase cooperation in these efforts and thus improve our national security. 
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III. MEASURING COOPERATION 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 The first chapter outlined five independent variables that should theoretically have 
an impact on cooperation between states in the area of nonproliferation activities.  This 
chapter discusses the independent and dependent variables in more depth and presents 
some descriptive statistics of the variables.  The descriptive statistics provide a useful 
starting point in the effort to understand any empirical explanations for nonproliferation 
cooperation.  The chapter concludes by testing the independent variables using a logistic 
regression model.  This method of testing will provide insight into the effects of the 
variables across a large number of cases.   
B.  OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES 
 There is an abundance of literature on international cooperation.  Most theories 
are tested through a case study approach because it is difficult to quantitatively measure 
cooperation.  This chapter uses data from multiple sources to model nonproliferation 
cooperation across a large number of cases to discover patterns behind the decision to 
cooperate or not.  The five independent variables outlined in Chapter I are security 
assistance, alliances, involvement in international organizations, domestic politics, and 
economic freedom.  The dependent variables are the decision to cooperate in the PSI 
and/or in the GTRI.  The CTR program is not being tested because the program has been 
focused on a very small number of states to date.   
1. PSI and GTRI Support 
 The dependent variables are cooperation in the PSI and cooperation in the GTRI.  
The hypotheses developed in Chapter I will be tested once against cooperation in the PSI 
and once against cooperation in the GTRI.  For the PSI, a state is coded with a value of 1 
if it is listed on the Department of State list of PSI participants,84 and coded with a value 
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of zero if it is not listed.  For the GTRI, a state is coded as participating if it has 
participated in any GTRI programs including converting HEU research reactors and/or 
removing or protecting nuclear or radiological materials.  Any state listed as a global 
partner in the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Global Threat 
Reduction Strategic Plan for 2007 is coded with a one and any country not listed is coded 
with a value of 0.85   States codes with a value of one are considered to cooperate with 
the initiative and those coded with a value of zero are not cooperating.  Of the 46 states 
studied, 27 states support the PSI and 40 states participate in the GTRI.  The range of 
states participating is mixed with almost 50% participating in just one program and 
almost 50% participating in two programs as can be seen in table 3. 
 
Number of Programs in which 
State is Participating 0 1 2 
Number of States 2 22 22 
Table 3. States Participating in GTRI and/or PSI 
 
Since both of these programs are considered nonproliferation activities, it seems 
intuitive that they should be positively correlated with each other.  A state valuing 
nonproliferation would not just participate in one program but would participate in all 
programs.  However, the correlation coefficient between PSI support and GTRI 
participation is -.06 which reveals there is only a very slight negative correlation between 
states cooperating in the two programs.  One explanation for this divergence is the nature 
of the two programs.  While both fall under the broad umbrella of nonproliferation 
activities, the PSI, as a counterproliferation program, is inherently offensive and thus 
much more aggressive than the GTRI, which is a defensive program and more passive.  It 
is likely to be politically more tenable, for some states, to participate in a defensive 
program than an offensive one.  This aspect will be examined further in the case studies.    
                                                 
85 Located at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/Na-20/docs/GTRI_Strategic_Plan_2007.pdf, last accessed 
September 2007. 
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2.  Security Assistance 
 The United States provides security assistance to many countries for many 
different reasons.  Our hypothesis predicts that U.S. security assistance will positively 
effect the decision to cooperate.  Because national governments deal in large budgets, it 
would take a significant amount of security assistance to influence the decision to 
cooperate and thus it can be predicted that as security assistance increases, so too will its 
ability to influence cooperation.  The data for this variable is taken from the 
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2008.  This 
document provides the “actual” dollars provided to foreign countries in 2006.  Of the 46 
states outlined in Chapter I, 41 states received at least $10 million in security assistance 
in 2006.  The amount of security assistance ranged from a low of zero dollars for the 
states of Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Syria to a high of over $9 billion for Japan.  In all, 
the mean amount received was $865 million while the median amount received was $80 
million.  In Figure 2 it can be seen that while the U.S. does give security assistance to 
many countries, meaningful amounts of assistance, which might be expected to factor 
into a decision to cooperate, appears to be given to only a handful of the 46 states 




























































































Figure 2. Security Assistance by Country 
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3.  Alliances  
 The United States exhibits defensive cooperation with states through several 
means such as joint exercises, officer exchanges, and military training.  However, this 
variable codes only countries with a formal defense treaty, such as members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the security treaty between the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS), as having an alliance with the United States.  A 
state with an alliance is coded with a value of one while a state without an alliance is 
given a value of zero.  Since an alliance often arises from a desire to counter a mutual 
security threat, it makes intuitive sense that these states would share a similar view on the 
threat of WMD and cooperate in initiatives to counter that threat.  As seen in Figure 3, 18 
of the 46 states have an alliance with the United States.  Of those 18 states, 94% 
cooperate in the PSI and 89% cooperate in the GTRI.  Of the 28 states that do not have an 
alliance, 57% cooperate in the PSI and 85% cooperate in the GTRI.  These numbers 
provide an indication that an alliance with the U.S. might have some influence on 





















Figure 3. Number of States in Alliance with United States 
4.  International Organizations 
 There are hundreds of international organizations that states participate in.  
Theory predicts that as states become more involved with international organizations, the 
benefits of acting in a responsible manner and the costs of not conforming to global 
norms become more meaningful.  This variable, called international, combines data from 
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a representative sample of international economic and nonproliferation-related 
organizations to measure participation.  The data for participation in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) comes from the WTO web site.  If a state is listed as a member then 
it receives a value of one for participation and if not it receives a value of zero.86  The 
data for participation in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) come from the IMF web 
site.87  A country is given a value of one for participation in the IMF if it has a voting 
power of one-half of a percent or greater of the total voting power based on the member’s 
quota.  A country is given a value of zero if it has less than one-half of a percent voting 
power.  The data for participation in the World Bank comes from the World Bank web 
site.88  A state is given a value of one if it participates in at least four of the five of the 
World Bank institutions.  States that participate in three or less institutions are given a 
value of zero.  The data for the World Health Organization (WHO) comes from the WHO 
web site.89  A state listed as a member on the WHO web site is given a value of one while 
states not listed are given a value of zero.  Data for participation in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) comes from the NSG web site.90  States listed as members are given a 
value of one while states not listed are given a value of zero.  Data for participation in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) comes from the WA web site.91  States listed as members 
are given a value of one while states not listed are given a value of zero.  Data for 
participation in the Australia Group comes from the Australia Group web site.92  States 
listed as participants are given a value of one while states not listed are given a value of 
zero.  Data for membership in the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic 
                                                 
86 WTO member information located at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, last accessed May 2007. 
87 IMF data found at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm, last accessed May 
2007. 
88 WB member information found at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20103870~menuPK:16
97011~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html, last accessed May 2007. 
89 WHO information found at http://www.who.int/countries/en/, last accessed May 2007. 
90 NSG member information found at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/member.htm, last 
accessed May 2007. 
91 WA member information found at www.wassenaar.org, last accessed May 2007. 
92 Australia Group participant information found at www.australiagroup.net/en/agpart.htm, last 
accessed May 2007. 
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Missile Proliferation (ICOC) comes from the State Department Bureau of 
Nonproliferation web site.93  States listed as subscribing to the ICOC are given a value of 
one while states not listed are given a value of zero. 
 The range of INTERNATIONAL participation ranges from a low a one 
organization to a high of eight organizations as shown in Figure 4.  The mean 
participation is 5.7 organizations and the median participation is seven organizations.  
The high median participation provides evidence that participation in international 
organizations, at least in the sample selected, is more the norm than not.  High 
participation lends strength to the norms theory behind the influence of these 
organizations on cooperation.  States that do not follow the global “norm” of high 
participation in international organizations might also not follow the norm of 
nonproliferation.  High participation also gives more weight to the issue linkage theory.  
The more states participating in an international organization allows for a greater number 

















Figure 4.  Amount of Participation in International Organizations 
5.  Domestic Politics 
 The role domestic politics plays in a state’s decision to cooperate is a complex 
one.  The interaction of elites, interest groups and the public occurs within state-specific 
                                                 
93 ICOC member information found at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/27799.htm, last accessed 
October 2007. 
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political systems that allow for varying amounts of influence from domestic politics.  
While data can be found for some aspects of this variable, as a whole, it is not easily 
measured by quantitative means.  Due to its complexity, this variable will be examined 
solely in the case study chapter.  
6.  Economic Freedom 
 The economic freedom (EF) score measures data from 10 economic freedom 
categories and equally blends the results to produce an economic freedom score.  The 
scores are compiled through a joint effort of the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage 
Foundation and rank 161 countries to produce the Index of Economic Freedom.  Our 
theory, from Chapter I, predicts that higher economic freedom scores indicate a more 
open economy where economic interest groups influence decision makers to pursue 
globally responsible policies that further integrate the state into the world market place.  
Since the U.S. is one of the largest economic markets in the world, it is in most countries’ 
economic interest to cooperate on issues important to the United States.  A higher 
economic freedom score should result in higher levels of cooperation with U.S. 
nonproliferation programs.  The data for this variable comes from the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom web page and is shown in Figure 5.94   
One country, Sudan, did not have an economic freedom score, so this variable 
measures the influence of economic freedom across 45 countries.  The EF scores range 
from a low of 3 for North Korea to a high of 82.7 for Australia.  The mean score is 61.8 
and the median score is 62.4.  If our theory holds true, countries with higher scores 
should cooperate with the United States in nonproliferation activities.  Given that more 
than half of the countries participate in both the PSI and the GTRI, an EF score above 62 
should predict cooperation.   
 
                                                 
94 Economic Freedom data found at http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm, last 



























































































Figure 5. Economic Freedom Score by Country 
C.  MODEL RESULTS 
 The dependent variable, either PSI or GTRI participation, is a dichotomous 
variable coded either one for cooperation or 0 for not cooperating.  The appropriate 
method of testing a model with a dichotomous dependent variable uses logistic regression 
(or a similar alternative) instead of the more common linear regression technique.  This 
section subjects the hypotheses from Chapter I to a statistical test.  
1.  Evaluation of PSI Support Model 
 The results of the logistic regression, which estimates the probability of a certain 
event occurring, are shown in Table 4.  In this model, the one statistically significant 
variable, at the .05 level, is International Organizations.  The coefficient is positive which 
indicates that cooperation in the PSI increases with more participation in international 
organizations.  With this result, we can say that participation in international institutions 
facilitates state cooperation in nonproliferation efforts.  The variables Alliance, Security 
Assistance, and Economic Freedom are all positive, as expected, but are not statistically 
significant.  This suggests that involvement in alliances with the United States, using 
security assistance as a method of influencing cooperation, and the openness of states 
economic systems do not have a measurable effect on the level of cooperation in the PSI.  
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Variable Coeffic ient Std. Error t statistic S ignificance
Constant -5.87 3.23 -1.82 0.04
International 0.70 0.33 2.13 0.02
Alliance 0.30 0.76 0.40 0.48
Security Asst. 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.46
Econom ic Freedom 0.04 0.05 0.88 0.19
N=46  
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results; PSI as Dependent Variable  
2.  Evaluation of GTRI Support Model 
The results of the logistic regression for the GTRI model are shown in Table 5.  
As expected, the coefficients of International Organizations and Security Assistance are 
positive.  However, neither variable is statistically significant at the .05 level.  This 
indicates that involvement in international organizations and the use of U.S. Security 
Assistance does not have a measurable effect on participation in the GTRI.  The 
coefficient for the variables Alliance and Economic Freedom are negative and neither is 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  This result implies that state alliances with the 
U.S. and the openness of a state’s economic system do not have an effect on participation 
in the GTRI.  In fact, the negative coefficient even implies less cooperation with this 
program if states are in an alliance with the U.S. or have an open economic system.  The 
results provide a strong argument against looking at alliances or economic freedoms as a 
method of increasing cooperation in the GTRI program. 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t statistic Significance
Constant 3.55 2.55 1.39 0.09
International 0.02 0.31 0.07 0.47
Alliance -0.08 0.60 -0.13 0.45
Security Asst. 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.16
Economic Freedom -0.04 0.05 -0.79 0.22
N=46  
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results; GTRI as Dependent Variable 
D.  CONCLUSION 
 This chapter looked at measuring cooperation with nonproliferation programs by 
using statistical analysis to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter I against the 
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behavior of 46 states.  The results support the hypothesis that participation in 
international organizations increases the level of cooperation in nonproliferation 
programs.  However, this finding is weakened by the fact that international institutions 
proved significant in only one of the two nonproliferation programs.  The influence of 
institutions on international cooperation is complex and can result from such factors as 
facilitating communication, increasing reciprocity, imparting legitimacy, and linking 
issues.  The next chapter will focus on the domestic political variable but will also take a 
deeper look at the impact of institutions to examine what aspect of institutions increase 
cooperation. 
 There was some evidence found in the descriptive statistics section to support the 
role of alliances increasing cooperation in the PSI program.  However, in our regression 
analysis, there was no evidence to support this finding resulting in very weak support for 
the hypothesis that states are more likely to cooperate in nonproliferation programs if 
they are an ally of the United States.  There is an element of intuitive sense to this finding 
when measuring initiatives that aim for high global participation.  The number of states 
the U.S. has a formal defensive treaty with stays fairly constant from year to year and 
remains at a low number relative to the number of states in the world.  Thus as global 
cooperation increases and participation goes from 11 states to over 80, as in the case of 
the PSI, the effect of a static influence like alliances will experience diminishing 
explanatory power.  A further avenue of study would be to look at cooperation over time 
to see if alliances influence early cooperation in a nonproliferation initiative. 
 Finally, there is no support for either the hypothesis that states are more likely 
cooperate if they receive U.S. security assistance or that the likelihood of cooperation  
increases as a state’s Economic Freedom score increases.  There could be many 
explanations for the lack of influence these variables have.  The small amount of security 
assistance given to most states is likely not enough to influence a government’s decision 
either for or against cooperation.  A case like Egypt, where it receives a significant 
amount of assistance (almost $2 billion/year) but still do not cooperate in the PSI, 
provides further support for the weakness this variable displays in predicting cooperation.  
The absence of support for the economic freedom score could either be a failure in the 
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index or more likely points toward the weakness in relating the theory behind the 
influence of economic interest groups to matters which can be considered to fall in the 
national security realm.  Economic interest groups likely have more success influencing 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis now moves from a statistical examination of cooperation to a case 
study approach.  This chapter focuses on the policies of three countries in order to 
understand the underlying dynamics involved in the decision to cooperate in 
nonproliferation activities over the past five years.  In particular, it examines the 
subnational independent variable “domestic politics.”  The three domestic actors 
examined in detail consist of the political elites, interest groups, and the public.  The three 
countries studied, Russia, China, and India, all have taken different views on cooperation 
with the United States.  Although the three states were chosen to test the hypothesis on 
domestic politics, other factors discovered, which influence cooperation, will be 
discussed also.  Thus the case studies suggest additional leads for future research in the 
area of international cooperation and nonproliferation. 
B.  RUSSIA 
 The Russian government is considered a federal republic with President Vladimir 
Putin filling the role of the head of state.  The executive branch of the government is 
headed up by a prime minister who is appointed by the president.  Legislative authority 
resides in the Federal Assembly, which consists of the State Duma and the Federal 
Council.  Although the Russian system of government has elements that are theoretically 
democratic, President Putin has implemented numerous changes during his seven year 
tenure resulting in consolidation of governmental power “in the hands of the president 
and in the agencies of the executive branch, while the influence of the legislative branch 
is limited.”95  The primary executive branch organization involved with nonproliferation 
is the Ministry for Industry and Energy (MIE), which has control over the nuclear,  
                                                 
95 Ksenia Yudaeva, “The Russian Political System and Economic Growth,”  Post-Soviet Economies in 
Transition (Moscow Carnegie, March 2004), http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/briefings/70011.htm, last 
accessed August 2007.   
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biological and chemical weapons programs.  Russia has participated in the CTR program, 
since its creation in the early 1990s, and has participated in both the PSI and GTRI since 
2004. 
According to the global intelligence service Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR), 
the three factions influencing the state’s decisions are: 
The St. Petersburg brigade, which consists of western leaning technocrats 
from Putin’s hometown, the state oligarchs, who are billionaires and 
leaders of state controlled assets in key policy positions, and the siloviki, 
which is mostly made up of former KGB members focused on national 
security.96   
In addition to analyzing the political elites, considered the St. Petersburg brigade and the 
siloviki, and the interest groups, composed of the military, oligarchs, and the executive 
agencies, this section will also examine the views of the public. 
1.  Political Elites 
 While there are numerous political elites in Russia, Putin has consolidated power 
to the point where the regime can almost be considered authoritarian.  He won reelection 
as President in March 2004 with 71% of the vote and is the “unchallenged master of the 
Russian political scene today with no credible political rivals.”97  Among the three 
domestic political groups considered, he far and away has the most power to influence 
the direction of the state and decisions on cooperation in nonproliferation activities.  
Therefore, this section of the thesis will focus mainly on Putin as most of the significant 
political elites owe their positions to him and generally support his decisions.  The one 
additional group mentioned is the siloviki who have enough influence to merit analysis. 
  Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000 and took the reins of a country that 
had suffered through losing the cold war followed by a decade of economic disaster 
where almost every element of Russian power and influence declined.  Stuart Goldman, 
of the Congressional Research Service, claims “from the Day Putin became President to 
                                                 
96 STRATFOR, “Russia's Fading Siloviki,” Strategic Forecasting, July 10, 2007, 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291902, last accessed July 2007. 
97 Stuart Goldman, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests” (CRS Report 
for Congress, May 2007), 1. 
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the present time, he has insisted that Russia’s most urgent need and his top priority was 
the reconstruction and revitalization of the economy.”98 Putin understood that good 
relations with the West would be vitally important to achieving his goal and restarting the 
Russian economy.  His grand strategy involved restoring Russia’s great power status 
through economic development enabled by further integration with the West.  One 
important part of this strategy was entry into the WTO, which would facilitate Russian 
integration into the global economy.  Acceptance into the WTO was only possible with 
U.S. and Western European support.  Due to this philosophy, Putin was very amenable 
towards cooperation with the West on numerous issues including nonproliferation.   
a.  Views on Security 
The Russian experience in Chechnya and the attacks of Chechen terrorists 
in Russia have greatly impacted Putin’s current view on terrorism.  The U.S. and Russia 
share similar views on terrorism and WMD with slight but important differences.  Even 
before the attacks of September 11th, Putin was proposing the idea of Russia-U.S. 
cooperation against terrorism.99  “For Putin, the key threats do not come from the United 
States, but from terrorist activities and those nations falling behind economically.”100  
The attacks of September 11th gave Putin the chance to make great strides in advancing 
U.S.-Russia cooperative efforts.  During the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Russia 
facilitated U.S. efforts to establish temporary bases and operate out of former Soviet 
Union states in Central Asia.  During a 2003 speech to the United Nations, Putin said: 
Terrorism is a challenge to security and to the economic future of our 
planet and a serious remaining challenge of today is the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that they might get into 
the hands of terrorists.101    
                                                 
98 Stuart Goldman, Russian National Security Policy after September 11 (CRS Report for Congress, 
Aug  2002), 8. 
99 Ibid., 19. 
100 Andrei Tsygankov, “If Not by Tanks, then by Banks?  The Role of Soft Power in Putin’s Foreign 
Policy,”  Europe-Asia Studies 58 (November 2006): 1082. 
101 Vladimir Putin, Statement by Russian President at the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, September 25, 2003. 
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Although the U.S. and Russia share similar views on the threat of terrorism, “Moscow 
does not view terrorism as a state-based phenomenon and would prefer that interstate 
cooperation, not regime change, be the basis for dealing with it.”102   Thus, Russia did 
not support the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the different approaches to nonproliferation 
remain an area of friction between the two countries. 
b.  Views on Nonproliferation 
Russia is a member of the NPT and a strong supporter of the IAEA.  There 
is a long history of arms control and a commitment to the idea of nonproliferation 
embedded within the state.  Putin supports the use of international treaties as a way to 
control proliferation and wants international institutions to play the primary role in 
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.  It is not in the strategic interest of Russia to 
see the spread of nuclear weapons or the spread of other forms of WMD.  In fact, most of 
the new nuclear weapon states are in close proximity to Russia and pose a greater 
potential threat to Russia than to the United States.  However, with Russia’s differing 
view on the threat of the state, comes a different preference for dealing with the problem 
of proliferation.   
Russia favors achieving nonproliferation through economic compensation 
and security guarantees while the U.S. prefers unrelenting coercive 
diplomacy, including sanctions and threat of military action, until the 
proliferating state gives in.103   
This important difference in viewpoint has led Russia and the U.S. to treat cases of 
potential proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, differently.  In the case of Iran, 
Russia does not see any problem with Iran developing a nuclear power industry as long 
as it conforms to IAEA protocols.  In fact, the Russians have a $1 billion interest in 
building a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran.  This reactor project is an important part  
                                                 
102 Andrei Tsygankov, “New Challenges for Putin’s Foreign Policy,” Orbis (Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, Winter 2006), 158. 
103 Yong-Chool Ha and Beom-Shik Shin, Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula,  
Strategic Studies Institute (December 2006), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/, last accessed 
July 2007).  
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of Russia’s plan to build its export industry and is covered in more detail later in this 
chapter.  These different views might also account for the fact that Russia did not initially 
support the PSI.   
c.  Views on PSI 
The philosophical differences between Putin and Bush on the appropriate 
methods to curb proliferating states can account for the reason Russia did not initially 
support the PSI.  Given the Bush administration view of Iran as an “axis of evil” country, 
Putin had a real concern that the U.S. would use the PSI to interfere with the Russian 
nuclear program in Iran.  Putin’s primary objection to the PSI was that it might not 
comply with international law.  As long as the PSI conformed to international law, it 
would not interfere with legitimate commercial nuclear activity between Russia and Iran.  
Once assured by the Bush administration that the PSI would follow international law, 
diplomatic sources in Moscow said the “program’s objectives are in line with Russia’s 
interests.”104  A second reason Putin eventually came around to supporting the PSI was 
because the Russian-U.S. relationship, including the various aid programs, is extremely 
important to Putin.  He wanted to show his good will by supporting one of President 
Bush’s principal foreign policy objectives in the nonproliferation arena.  Although Russia 
has publicly pledged to support the PSI, and is a regular attendee at annual meetings, it 
has shown little interest in participating in operational exercises or becoming 
significantly involved in the effort.   
d.  Views on CTR 
Although increasing natural resource pricing has greatly benefited the 
Russian economy, it still has a long way to go before the economic turn-around can be 
considered successful.  The U.S. aid programs, started after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, were a crucial source of funds for Russia.  The Russian defense budget suffered 
substantial cutbacks during the 1990s and the only way Russia could afford to downsize 
its costly nuclear forces was through U.S. aid.  In total, “the United States supplied $14 
                                                 
104 BBC News, “Russia taking its time to think about US nonproliferation initiative,” Interfax news 
agency, January 30, 2004, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0306/doc14.htm#02, last accessed July 06. 
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billion to encourage democracy and market reform, for humanitarian aid, and for WMD 
reduction in Russia.”105  These funds provided a life-line to Russia as it sought to 
improve its fiscal position.  In fact, when the U.S. proposed expanding nonproliferation 
efforts into additional countries, Russian diplomats expressed concern about losing funds 
and said “It is important to first fulfill the original intent of the Global Partnership − 
securing $20 billion in nonproliferation funding for Russia by 2012 − before considering 
an expansion of the effort.”106   
Now that the Russian economic picture has improved, the U.S. funding for 
CTR projects is going to be more fully shared.  Since much of the early U.S. funding 
went to American businesses providing support in Russia, this will result in more funds 
going to Russian businesses and should increase the support for these projects among the 
general population.  Another crucial factor in cooperation was that the downsizing of the 
nuclear forces was in line with Russia’s strategic vision.  Putin was an advocate for 
strategic nuclear arms reduction, and cooperation with the U.S. allowed Russia to use 
CTR funds to make the reductions required by both the START treaty and its reduced 
defense budget. 
e.  Views on GTRI 
In a 2003 interview with the BBC, Putin said: 
We should always remember that the problem of proliferation of nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction is closely related to the threat of 
terrorism, because terrorists attempt to acquire certain means of mass 
destruction.107 
These words further emphasize Putin’s view on terrorism as the preeminent threat facing 
Russia.  Putin’s support for the GTRI program comes from the belief that terrorists will 
try to acquire the means to cause mass destruction.  Russia has experienced the dangers 
                                                 
105 Goldman, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests,” 1. 
106 Mike Nartker, “United States Supports Expansion of G-8 Nonproliferation Effort,” Global Security 
Newswire, April 27, 2004. 
107 BBC News, “Interview with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin by the British 
BBC television and radio company,” Moscow, June 22, 2003, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0306/doc14.htm#02, last accessed July 2006. 
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involved with radiation contamination first hand with the Chernobyl disaster and has no 
desire to see terrorists acquire the materiel for a radiological bomb.  The limiting factor to 
date has been the cost involved with implementing such a program.  Although Putin 
would agree that radiological sources at civilian sites pose a threat, the priority for funds 
has gone to other initiatives.  Over the past decade, the military sources of fissile 
material, not to mention actual nuclear warheads, posed a much greater risk than the 
civilian sites.  Now that the military sites have attained a certain level of security, and the 
Russian government is running a budget surplus, Putin will likely start to put more 
resources into this program.  Any funds received through cooperation with the U.S. 
would be added incentive to accelerate the program.  
f.  The Siloviki 
The siloviki are former members of the military, security, or police forces 
that hold prominent positions in Putin’s government.  They favor nationalist policies and 
want to see the return of Russia as a great power.  They do not favor cooperation with the 
U.S. and still see the Russian-U.S. relationship as adversarial.  They favor centralization 
of national resources such as oil, gas, and ores.  While the pro-Western policies of Putin 
are not to the liking of the siloviki, Putin has given control of key resources to them and 
has advocated expansion of the Federal Security Service and Foreign Intelligence 
Service.  These moves have retained the siloviki support but have fallen short of giving 
them enough power to change Putin’s overall strategy of integrating more thoroughly 
with the West.  Putin is careful to move out siloviki members who have the potential of 
becoming political rivals before they attain enough power to be a true threat.    
2.  Interest Groups 
 Putin has long had a strategy of balancing the competing interests in Russia.  He 
balances the military, oligarchs, and siloviki to ensure none gain too much power while 
placing people loyal to him into key positions.108  In his first two years in power, “Putin 
instituted major personnel changes in the military high command, removing a number of 
                                                 
108 STRATFOR, “Russia: Mixing Oil and Politics,” Strategic Forecasting, March 27, 2007, 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=286446, last accessed Jul 2007. 
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outspoken advocates of anti-western, anti-U.S. military policies.”109  He also removed 
the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of oil giant Yukos and the richest man in 
Russia, and prosecuted him for tax evasion.  Later, Putin arranged for the assets of Yukos 
to be split up with some going to another oligarch who more fully supported him and 
some becoming state controlled.  While interest groups in Russia have an influence on 
state policy, it is limited due to the strength of Putin’s rule. 
a.  The Military 
  Military support for cooperation with the U.S. has increased since Putin 
removed a number of key leaders.  Prior to that, support for the CTR program was strong 
in the segments of the military that received funding and benefited from projects.  
Although some did not like having U.S. personnel in sensitive sites, the Russians also 
benefited from the interaction of personnel in the CTR program.  “The parties often 
obtained more information about each other’s WMD-related capabilities and policies than 
they acquired through formal arms control accords.”110  Since the budget and force 
reductions of the 1990s, the Russian military has lost much of its influential power.  
“Their previously privileged position in the allocation of resources has been broken, as 
has their almost sacrosanct status in official ideology and propaganda.”111  Therefore, 
military elites have less influence in determining whether Russia cooperates with the U.S. 
than they did during the cold war years.  Putin has also retained the support of the 
military by increasing defense spending by double-digit percentages for seven years in a 
row.112  As spending ramps back up, equipment and training improve, as does the pride 
of the Russian armed forces. 
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b.  The Oligarchs 
  The oligarchs are the billionaire business leaders of powerful industrial 
sectors of the economy.  They gained power in the 1990s and consolidated many 
lucrative business sectors through often corrupt means.  Their immense wealth leaves 
them unpopular with the public and Putin’s government, if they do not support Putin.   
Since 2003, Putin has been centralizing control of the energy sector to take back some of 
the profits that have flowed into oligarch hands.  Any oligarch with political ambitions 
who runs contrary to Putin’s desires faces the possibility of imprisonment and 
confiscation of all assets as happened to Yukos.  According to Strategic Forecasting, 
The Yukos dismemberment achieved a number of Moscow’s goals. First, 
it destroyed the political career of former Yukos CEO Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky. Second, it removed Yukos from the Russian economic 
scene, destroying a tool that otherwise would have been used to launch a 
political program in opposition to the Kremlin.113 
Third it sent a powerful message to all of the oligarchs to stay out of politics and in 
Putin’s favor.  Although it is likely the oligarchs would support greater cooperation with 
the United States, as a means to expand their business interests, the oligarchs are not seen 
as a group with significant impact on Russian political cooperation with the West.  
c.  The Executive Agencies 
The Ministry for Industry and Energy (MIE) is the executive agency that 
is the primary organization involved with nonproliferation efforts.  It contains the 
previously independent Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom), which plays the 
lead role in nuclear nonproliferation activities and construction of nuclear power plants.  
The MIE has been a supporter of CTR as the funds provided by this program have been 
indispensable in securing and converting nuclear sites and transitioning several of 
Russia’s nuclear cities from weapon development to peaceful research.  They also  
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support the GTRI but lack adequate funding to carry out the program.  In cases where 
they can receive international funding, they have fully participated in reactor conversion 
and recovery of HEU. 
However, in regards to the PSI, the MEI has serious concerns over 
interference in its civilian nuclear export program.   The nuclear industry is one of the 
few areas where Russia is still a global leader and nuclear technology exports provide 
vital funding for the MEI.  During the 1990s, Rosatom was regularly under-funded due to 
the massive economic turmoil the Russian economy experienced and the huge cost of 
dismantling the vast nuclear infrastructure that was created to support the arms race 
during the cold war.   
The income derived from foreign shipments has become an extremely 
important means for keeping this colossal infrastructure of sites and the 
people connected with them going.  Extra-budgetary income from foreign 
contracts with China, India, Iran, and other countries has become 
indispensable for life support of this immense social and technological 
organism.114   
The reliance on nuclear exports has given rise to a policy that potentially puts business 
before nonproliferation concerns.  The MEI does not scrutinize the motives or track-
record of purchasing countries too closely.  Efforts by the U.S. to promote 
nonproliferation are seen as having an ulterior motive.  “The Russian government broadly 
shares its national atomic energy agency’s view that the U.S. aims to take Russia out of 
nuclear energy cooperation with Iran and North Korea, so as to undercut Russia’s 
position on the world civilian nuclear technology market.”115  In all, the MEI supports 
cooperation with the U.S. in nonproliferation activities as long as it is profitable and there 
is no hindrance to its export business. 
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3.  The Public 
 Putin’s strategy to balance all of the competing interests relies on his leadership 
ability to maintain the domestic coalition.  Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie 
Moscow Center, asserts: 
Putin’s way of dealing with the oligarchs alienated many business elites, 
while his military reforms are straining his relation with the military.  The 
more he presses forward, the more likely he is to lose support of the elites, 
leaving him reliant on the support of the general public.116  
Luckily for Putin, he enjoys strong support from the public.  Compared to the 1990s, life 
in Russia is better.  Specifically, Russians enjoy a higher standard of living and more 
domestic security, albeit with less freedom.  Putin’s reign has coincided with the rise in 
world oil and gas prices which have helped boost the Russian economy.  Economic 
performance has remained relatively strong since 2000 with “yearly increases in GDP 
averaging 6.7% annually.  During this time, poverty has declined steadily and the middle 
class has continued to expand.”117  The recovery in Russia’s economy has enabled the 
country to once again become assertive in world politics and has rekindled national pride.  
Although the Russian public’s view of the U.S. has dropped from 61% favorable in 2002 
to 41% favorable in 2007, more than 84% of Russians still say they have confidence in 
Putin’s approach to world affairs.118  Putin’s willingness to cooperate with the West on 
certain policies does not seem to be enough of an issue to damage his public support, 
even with the growing anti-U.S. sentiment of the Russian people.  As long as this backing 
remains high, he will have an easier time continuing his cooperation with the United 
States in areas of nonproliferation.   
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4.  Conclusion 
 In Russia, the domestic politics variable does not appear to have a strong 
influence on the decision to cooperate with the U.S. in nonproliferation efforts.  Putin’s 
power is so dominant that negative views from some political elites regarding 
cooperation with the West, and disfavor from many business and military elites over how 
he’s treated them, are not enough to alter Russia’s course in this regard.  Even the 
public’s generally unfavorable view of the U.S. was not enough to change their overall 
view of Putin’s foreign policy.  Russia has received a lot of monetary assistance from the 
U.S. and there is evidence that this played a significant role in the decision to cooperate 
in the CTR, GTRI, and PSI programs.  Although this thesis primarily focuses on the last 
five years, there is evidence indicating financial incentives involved with the CTR 
program were a major factor in influencing Russia’s decision to initially cooperate in the 
early 1990s. However, the evidence also shows that these programs were aligned with 
Russia’s grand strategy.  This is important as there is no evidence to indicate the aid in 
the 1990s would have influenced Russia had nonproliferation not been in its interest.  
Finally, there is evidence to support the role of international institutions in the decision to 
cooperate.  Russia is a strong advocate for using international institutions to combat 
WMD proliferation and fully backs the international norms against the spread of WMD.  
In 2006, Russia signed a trade agreement with the U.S. which paved the way for entry 
into the WTO after 12 years of negotiation.119  This agreement was a major incentive for 
Russian cooperation with the U.S. on various issues including nonproliferation.  This 
further highlights the role of international institutions linking issues and connecting 
current events with future consequences.  In this case, Russian cooperation in 
international nonproliferation regimes and programs helped secure entry into the WTO 
and future economic benefits.  Another reason Russia supports international institutions is 
due to their ability to restrain the actions of its members.  Russia is currently focusing the 
majority of its efforts on recovering some of the power and influence it lost when the 
Soviet Union broke apart.  The U.S. does not have this problem and is relatively freer and 
                                                 
119 BBC News, “US paves way for Russia WTO entry,” November 19, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6163008.stm, last accessed July 2007. 
 63
much more capable to globally project power.  Russia, as a member of the U.N. Security 
Council, has veto power over U.N. actions.  Further incorporation of nonproliferation 
activities into the U.N. would give Russia the means to curtail nonproliferation efforts 
which do not align with Russian interests. 
C.  CHINA 
 The Chinese government is considered a communist government with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) existing as the sole political party.  China’s chief of state is 
President Hu Jintao and the executive branch of the government, called the State Council, 
is headed up by Premier Wen Jiabao.  The country is composed of 23 provinces, five 
autonomous regions and four municipalities. The National People’s Congress (NPC) is 
composed of representatives from all of these areas as well as the military and is the 
highest body of power in China.  Although China is an autocratic government which 
exercises national control, “decentralization in both the political and economic arenas”120 
has made the provincial leaders a political force with strong incentives to promote local 
interests.  This “localism” poses a challenge to the central government in that it 
constrains its ability to impose national solutions and makes national integration more 
difficult.   
The primary executive branch organizations involved with nonproliferation are 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament, which is active in international treaties and regimes, and the State 
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), 
which overseas the production of the defense plants.  This case study will analyze the 
political elites, the interest groups−composed of the military, industry, and the executive 
agencies−and the views of the public. 
1.  Political Elites 
 The CCP, headed by President Hu, maintains strict political control throughout 
the country.  While there is divergence in political goals between the central and local 
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levels, the CCP maintains total control as a party and sets the rules for political 
promotion.  The CCP sets the direction for the country, but the provinces execute these 
plans in a fairly autonomous manner.  It is in the execution of centralized policy where 
conflict in the area of nonproliferation can occur.   
The central government makes the national decisions on cooperation in 
nonproliferation programs.  However, local economics can create incentives for lower-
level political leaders to stress production and export over strict control of certain 
technologies.  This has created numerous instances where the central government has 
verbally supported nonproliferation but the U.S. has caught specific companies 
proliferating WMD technology.  The economic incentives to proliferate certain 
technologies can create internal political pressure from the provinces against 
nonproliferation.  These incentives will be further explored in the section focusing on 
interest groups.  Given that there is one-party rule in China, this section will focus on the 
predominant views of the CCP.   
One of the greatest challenges facing the CCP is sustaining economic growth.  
China has approximately 1.3 billion people and economic expansion is required to 
continue creating jobs and improving the standard of living.  “The overriding objective of 
Chinese foreign policy is to serve the CCP’s goal of sustaining rapid economic growth (a 
critical pillar of its political survival).”121  In this regards, China is very similar to Russia 
in that maintaining good relations with the West is important due to internal economic 
goals.  One important difference between the two countries is China’s economic 
performance which, over the last two decades, has been much better than Russia’s.  As a 
result, the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China is much greater.  Taken 
together, China has a strong economic incentive to cooperate with the West, including 
nonproliferation activities, but it is also in a stronger position to resist Western pressure. 
  a.  Views on Security 
  Although the Chinese have been the victim of terrorist attacks as recently 
as the 1990s, they do not consider terrorism to be as significant and pervasive a threat as 
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the U.S. does.  After September 11, “Beijing said it offered ‘unconditional support’ in 
fighting terrorism.”122  However, the reality is that there has been little terrorism 
cooperation between the U.S. and China.  As Minxin Pei notes, “The Chinese ruling 
elites tend to view the outside world with an unusual degree of wariness and insecurity 
brought about by their realist views.”123  These views influence the way the Chinese 
perceive U.S. actions and tend to make them suspicious of the motives behind U.S. 
security initiatives.  China sees many of the U.S. actions as a means to either extend U.S. 
power or to limit the power of developing nations, such as itself.    
b.  Views on Nonproliferation 
   The CCP primarily views nonproliferation efforts as a way to enhance 
China’s image, a means to increase its security, and a bargaining tool to gain concessions 
from the United States.  Part of China’s drive to become an emerging great power is 
cultivating an image as a responsible power.  Its acceptance in world institutions depends 
to a degree on their adherence to international norms.  In this regard, they do not want to 
be viewed as an obstacle to global nonproliferation efforts.  Their concern about image is 
one factor behind their entry into the NPT in 1992.  They are also a strong supporter of 
the IAEA and an advocate for the use of civilian nuclear power.  Dr. Jing-Dong Yuan, 
Senior Research Associate at the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, explains: 
China has acceded to most international treaties that are broadly based 
with universal membership and has by and large complied with their 
norms and rules but it has been critical to the largely Western-initiated, 
supply-sided multilateral export-control regimes.124  
  China also has a security stake in nonproliferation which underlies its 
support of the NPT.  As one of the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, China has 
an interest in maintaining the NPT regime.  As long as states adhere to the current treaty, 
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regional powers such as South Korea and Japan will not acquire nuclear weapons.  One 
of the main reasons China participates in the Six-Party Talks, to shut down North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program, is the fear that a nuclear-armed North Korea, or one with a 
larger arsenal, will provide the impetus for other countries in the region to pursue nuclear 
weapons.  The breakdown of the NPT regime would result in a decrease in China’s 
overall security. 
  A third reason China participates in nonproliferation activities is to gain a 
bargaining tool with the United States.  “Beijing is increasingly linking fulfillment of its 
nonproliferation commitments to changes in US policies in arms sales to Taiwan and 
missile defense.”125  Since the U.S. views proliferation as a higher security threat than do 
the Chinese, the Chinese use issue linkage to tie nonproliferation efforts to areas they see 
as greater security concerns.  In using this tool, China must balance its own security 
concerns with proliferation against concessions it might gain in other areas of concern, 
such as the independence movement in Taiwan. 
c.  Views on PSI 
  One of the most crucial states the U.S. hopes to bring into the PSI is 
China.  As one of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members, China’s support is 
vital to passing resolutions supporting WMD interdiction.  As a rising global power, 
China’s support will add to the legitimacy of the effort and likely bring along other 
regional actors.  In fact, the reason Vietnam has resisted U.S. pressure to join the PSI is 
due to the fear of “annoying its giant northern neighbor,”126 which currently opposes the 
PSI.  China is a leading regional power in the Asian Pacific, one of the regions of greatest 
proliferation concern, and its cooperation would be invaluable in conducting interdiction 
missions and in containing North Korea’s nuclear program.   
  China has so far refused to join the PSI because of its own experience with 
U.S. interdiction, its view on civilian nuclear power, and its geopolitical goals in the 
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region.  In 1993, the U.S. suspected a Chinese vessel, the Yinhe, of carrying precursor 
chemicals, needed to make chemical weapons, to Iran.  The U.S. contacted China with its 
allegations and requested to board the vessel.  The Chinese did not agree with the U.S. 
request or with its assessment of the cargo.  After several weeks of dialogue, and pressure 
from Washington, the Chinese agreed to divert the ship to a Saudi harbor for inspection.  
After it turned out the ship was not carrying the suspected chemicals, the Chinese 
demanded an apology and compensation for the delayed carrier.  The U.S. refused both 
requests.  This event generated a “long-lasting negative and emotional reaction to U.S. 
interdiction”127 that creates a psychological barrier to support of the PSI. 
  China, like Russia, also has concerns the PSI will be used to target 
legitimate shipment of civilian nuclear technology.  The Chinese view their nuclear 
exports as an important source of foreign income and a means to influence strategically 
important countries.  They view peaceful use of nuclear energy as a right that the IAEA 
guarantees to developing countries and they view Washington’s effort to curtail this use 
as a means to hold back certain nations.  The practice of exporting sensitive technologies 
as a means to gain influence goes beyond civilian nuclear power.  China practices this 
same strategy with weapons exports.  Strategic Forecasting predicts “Beijing – for 
geopolitical reasons – will continue to disseminate critical nuclear and missile 
technologies to a select few countries.”128  One such country is Pakistan.  China will 
continue to support Pakistan as a counterbalance to the growing power of India.  
Although China does not want a nuclear-armed neighbor in North Korea, it will probably 
continue to support North Korea out of a desire to prevent a united Korea that heavily 
favors the United States and to prevent a breakdown of the regime which might create a 
huge flow of refuges into China.  Lastly, China will also likely help out select countries 
in the Middle East and Africa to ensure a supply of oil for its energy-hungry industries.  
As long as it is in China’s strategic interest to proliferate some materials, it is doubtful it 
will support the PSI.   
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d.  Views on CTR 
  The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains tight control over the 
nuclear forces of China.  However, the security lacks technological sophistication which 
could pose a problem should insiders ever desire to steal nuclear material.  The closest 
the U.S. and China have come to a CTR program occurred in the 1990s when a lab-to-lab 
program was implemented to increase cooperation on technology sharing for nuclear 
security and accountability.  However, unrelated allegations of Chinese theft of nuclear 
secrets and broader political problems in overall U.S.-Chinese relations resulted in the 
elimination of the program. 
In looking at the security trade-off between accepting Western help to 
improve nuclear force security and potentially giving away important intelligence on its 
forces, China decidedly stands on the side of secrecy.  One of the fundamental 
requirements of a CTR program is transparency into how the funds are used.  This 
requires access to the sensitive sites where nuclear, chemical, or biological work would 
be occurring.  This is a requirement that is highly unlikely to ever be met.  The Chinese 
views on “military transparency measures typically run counter to those of the West and 
emphasize the potentially destabilizing effects that transparency can generate under 
certain conditions.”129  The best scenario the U.S. is likely to encounter is to bring China 
on-board as a supporter of the effort for either financial contributions or as a third-party 
initiator.  As a third party, China might be more successful implementing CTR-type 
programs in countries, such as Iran, that would not be amenable to a U.S. presence.  
e.  Views on GTRI 
  The GTRI program is a Russian-U.S. program to take back Russian/U.S. 
origin HEU fuel and to convert HEU research reactors to LEU fuel.  China, as a nuclear 
weapon state, is not eligible for the HEU take-back program even though it has Russian-
origin HEU.  The CCP has shown interest in participating in the parts of the program 
where China is eligible.  In 2005, China added nine of its research reactors to the Reduced 
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Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program to convert these rectors to use 
LEU fuel.130  The funding to convert these reactors is provided by the U.S. and there are no 
state secrecy issues involved with the civilian reactors.  To the CCP, there appears to be little 
downside to participating in this programs while it gains the benefits of removing a potential 
terrorist danger and the public relations appeal of  contributing to this nonproliferation effort.  
However, due to the lower threat perception shared by members of the CCP regarding 
nuclear terrorism, the CCP is not expanding on this initiative and proposing a take-back 
program of its own.  There is currently no program to recover the small amount of 
Chinese-origin HEU from any of the six countries where it currently resides. 
  2.  Interest Groups 
 Since its inception, the CCP has experienced a slow transition from strict one-man 
rule to a more consensus style of rule.  This has resulted in more factions being involved 
in state decisions and has increased the influence of interest groups.  The three interest 
groups examined in this section are the military, the business community, and the 
executive agencies.    
a.  The Military 
  The military enjoys strong influence in the decision making process to 
include holding seats in the NPC.  The military is highly defensive of its turf and is 
against any initiative that reduces the capability of its forces.  The military, combined 
with the members of the defense industrial base, strongly opposed China’s signing of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.131  They do not support the CTR 
program because they think they have good control of their WMD arsenal and they do 
not wish to provide the West with any information on their forces.   
 
                                                 
130 Charles Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (Council on Foreign Relations, 
March 2006), 28. 
131 Medeiros, “Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policies,” 87. 
 70
The PLA historically emphasized the importance of shrouding capabilities 
as a form of deterrence and China’s military leaders persist in their 
reluctance to share information for fear of what it might reveal about PLA 
strengths and weaknesses.132   
Their opposition to the PSI is not as great but they have little desire to share intelligence 
or participate in combined military exercises with the United States for the same reasons.   
b.  The Business Community 
  The importance of economic development to China’s rise in power cannot 
be overstated.  Economic power provides the means to achieve military power and those 
two elements combine to form national power.  Thus the goal of the CCP is continued 
economic expansion for both the good of the country and the good of its people.  In light 
of this, it is no surprise that the Chinese business community exerts a tremendous amount 
of influence over members of the CCP.  In addition, the business community exerts 
influence at the personal level through economic partnerships with local political leaders 
and monetary incentives, such as bribes and kickbacks.  In fact, in July 2007, two high 
ranking members of the State Food and Drug Administration were sentenced to death for 
accepting huge bribes and gifts in exchange for favorable treatment.133  In the area of 
nonproliferation, the business sectors involved with the exportation of nuclear 
technology, dual-use chemicals, and missile technology oppose efforts that promote 
nonproliferation and might restrict their sales.  Many businesses are also dependent on 
shipping for their export-driven business models and do not support the PSI due to its 
possible role in disrupting Chinese shipping.  
c.  The Executive Agencies 
  In the area of nonproliferation, the executive agencies that usually butt 
heads are the MFA and COSTIND.  Leading up to the signing of the CTBT, the MFA 
supported entry into the treaty and COSTIND was opposed to entry.  Their positions 
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reflect their mission.  The MFA interacts in the international arena and can advance state 
interests by participating in international regimes.  COSTIND has a more local outlook 
and usually takes a position similar to the business elites with which they regularly 
interact.   
Strong and pervasive financial and technical motives (external sales 
validate the technical achievements of certain institutes) for arms exports 
persist and they will continue to complicate the MFA’s involvement in 
arms export control decisions.134  
COSTIND opposes the PSI due to the possibility of interdictions being aimed at Chinese 
exports of weapons or sensitive technology falling under its purview. 
3.  The Public 
 Although the CCP rules China without any significant domestic opposition, any 
leader ruling a country of 1.3 billion people must take the mood of the population into 
account.  Two of the most important factors governing the relationship between the 
people and the central government, and underpinning the government’s legitimacy, are 
China’s economy and growing nationalism.   The Chinese economy, measured on a 
purchasing power parity basis, is the second largest in the world behind the United States. 
GDP growth has averaged approximately 10% per year over the last decade.135   This 
phenomenal growth has been achieved through economic reforms and decentralization 
and has served to keep the majority of the population satisfied with the performance of 
the government.  According to the 2007 Pew Global survey, 93% of the Chinese people 
view their country favorably which is up from 88% in 2005.136   
 However, while the majority of people view their government positively, the 
favorable view of the United States has dropped from 42% in 2005 to just 34% in 
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2007.137  The unfavorable view of the U.S. has the potential to negatively impact 
relations between China and the United States.  The heart of this problem lies with 
Chinese nationalism.  “The rise of the CCP was inseparably associated with Chinese 
nationalism and they have grown increasingly dependent on using nationalism as a source 
of political legitimacy.”138  The CCP uses the state-controlled media to frame issues in 
ways that portray the United States, and other countries such as Japan, negatively.  This 
framing generates feelings of nationalism and directs the emotions of the people away 
from problems with the state and focuses them on problems “created” by foreign powers.  
The force of nationalism has been an effective tool used by the CCP but it is a tool that 
cuts both ways, and the CCP must walk a fine line between the rhetoric it generates and 
the foreign policy it crafts.  The CCP leaders need to look no further than the last century 
when, as Susan Shirk notes, “mass movements, united by nationalism, accused leaders of 
failing to defend against foreign aggression and brought down the Qing Dynasty in 1911 
and the Republic of China in 1949.”139  The need to maintain this balance between 
nationalistic sentiments and foreign policy hinders strategic interaction with the U.S. and 
impedes cooperative efforts.  
4.  Conclusion 
 In China, the domestic politics variable does appear to have an influence on the 
decision to cooperate with the U.S. in nonproliferation efforts.  While the CCP dominates 
the political landscape, the trend toward consensus rule, the power of bureaucratic and 
economic constituents, and the nationalistic views of the people all combine to create a 
headwind restraining strategic cooperation with the United States.  These forces are by no 
means all-powerful and, when they conflict directly with the grand strategy of the 
country, they can lose out.  Such a case occurred when China joined the NPT and signed 
the CTBT.  The need to be seen as a responsible power, supporting global norms and 
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institutions, outweighed the influences of the interest groups.  However, when looking at 
mainly U.S. dominated programs, such as the CTR and PSI, they create obstructions 
toward cooperation.  There is evidence to support the role of international institutions in 
the decision to cooperate.  China appears to favor cooperation in nonproliferation 
activities that are founded on international norms and backed fully by the international 
community.  Since the PSI and CTR programs are predominately U.S.-led initiatives, 
their lack of cooperation fits with this hypothesis.  However, their cooperation in the 
GTRI program, another mainly U.S. program, poses a contradiction to this theory which 
might be explained by the low profile this program receives and the lack of domestic 
opposition this program generates.  Finally, Chinese leaders are focused on increasing 
participation in the international economy.  Cooperation in international programs, such 
as nonproliferation, creates good will which can be leveraged for further integration into 
the international community. 
D. INDIA 
 With a population exceeding one billion, India is the world’s largest democracy.     
It is a regional power in South Asia with aspirations of becoming a great power and 
improving its status in the international system.  The government is a federal republic 
where the majority of executive branch power rests with the Prime Minister, Manmohan 
Singh, and his cabinet.  The legislative branch consists of the 250-seat Council of States 
and the powerful 543-seat People’s Assembly, where the representatives are elected by 
popular vote from the country’s 28 states and seven union territories.  The top three 
parties in the People’s Assembly are the Indian National Congress (INC), 145 seats, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 129 seats, and the Communist Party and its allies with 60 
seats.  India consists of a diverse mixture of ethnicities, cultures, and languages, which 
generates internal instability.  The power of the government is maintained through a 
series of regional alliances and multi-party coalitions that act to constrain the actions of 
the Prime Minister.   
On the economic front, the market reforms implemented in the 1990s have paid 
big dividends for India’s economy but further reforms and public company privatization 
have been stalled by opposition in the People’s Assembly.  The large and growing 
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population continues to be the country’s biggest economic problem.  This case study will 
first analyze the security situation India finds itself in and the country’s views on 
nonproliferation.  It will then analyze the views of the political elites, interest groups, and 
the public toward cooperation with the United States in nonproliferation efforts. 
1.  National Security Situation 
India faces both internal and external challenges to its security.  It has suffered 
from numerous terrorist attacks over the last two decades committed by different tribal, 
ethnic, and religious movements.  India, like the United States, is concerned with the 
growth of radical Islam and the threat it represents.   Externally, India borders marginally 
stable states like Myanmar and Bangladesh, as well as sharing its borders with two 
nuclear-armed neighbors, China and Pakistan, with which it has fought border wars.  
Perhaps the single greatest challenge for India involves the disputed region of Kashmir.  
India has fought many skirmishes with Pakistan over this border region and accuses 
Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism and regularly inciting violence in this area. 
The history of terrorism has led India to consider the “pursuit of counterterror 
issues, at every possible multilateral and bilateral forum, a national priority.”140  The 
threat perception of India is remarkably similar to the U.S. after 9/11.  Both countries 
view transnational terrorists and failed states as a threat to their security.  In 2000, India 
and the U.S. established a joint working group on counterterrorism and after the 9/11 
attacks, India offered the U.S. full cooperation and the use of its bases for 
counterterrorism operations.141  Although the bases were never used due to objections 
from Pakistan, India has provided intelligence, logistical support, and maritime escorts to 
assist U.S. efforts in the “war on terror.”   
Even with similar threat perceptions, India and the U.S. do have some differences 
in their views on terrorism.  India’s initial overwhelming support for the U.S. led war on 
terror has cooled as it has become evident the U.S. does not plan on waging war on all 
terrorist groups in South Asia and instead is focuses almost entirely on Al Qaeda and the 
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Taliban.  This leaves Pakistan and pro-Pakistani groups, which India sees as a greater 
terrorist threat, excluded from direct U.S. action.  Further protecting Pakistan is its status 
as an essential U.S. ally in the war on terror due to its key geographic location.  This 
close relationship has frustrated India in that the U.S. has not been able to pressure 
Pakistan into discontinuing its cross-border terrorism. 
2. Views on Nonproliferation 
India is one of three countries that did not sign the NPT and which went on to 
develop nuclear weapons.  This puts them in an unusual status.  They possess nuclear 
weapons but are not recognized as an official nuclear power.  As such, they do not submit 
to IAEA inspections and are barred from receiving any assistance that would further their 
nuclear weapons program.  Although India is not part of the NPT, there has been no 
evidence they have assisted in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.   
Due partially to this record of nonproliferation, the Bush administration has gone 
against 20 years of nonproliferation tradition in signing an agreement to share civilian 
nuclear technology with India.  As part of this historic agreement, India must separate its 
civilian and military nuclear facilities to ensure U.S. assistance does not aid the Indian 
nuclear weapons program.  Also, India will place approximately 65% of its nuclear 
capacity under IAEA safeguards, assist international efforts to prevent the spread of 
enrichment technologies, and improve its export control mechanisms.142   
In the three areas of nonproliferation cooperation examined in this thesis, India 
has shown only limited cooperation.  India has participated in the GTRI through the 
conversion of one civilian research reactor from HEU to LEU.  It has not participated in 
the CTR program partly due to U.S. legal and treaty issues involved with assisting a non-
NPT state and partly because India does not want to be seen as needing outside 
assistance.  India has not joined the PSI even after repeated attempts by the U.S. to bring 
it on board.   
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3. Political Elites 
 As a democracy, India is more susceptible to the forces behind the domestic 
politics model than either Russia or China.  Its multi-party system, with no dominant 
political party, requires coalition building to successfully get legislation passed.  By its 
nature, coalition building consists of making compromises and concessions to other 
parties to gain their support.  This section will analyze the three leading political parties: 
the INC, BJP, and the Communist or leftist group.   
a. Indian National Congress 
The INC is the party with the most seats in the People’s Assembly.  The 
two most prominent party members are Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is a 
Western-educated economist, and INC party leader Sonia Ghandi, who “wields 
considerable influence over the ruling coalition’s policy decision-making process.”143  
Although the INC party is pressing for the civilian nuclear deal with the U.S., it has 
traditionally supported the non-aligned movement, which consists of a group of countries 
neither for nor against any of the great powers.  In supporting the nuclear deal, they have 
had to go to great lengths to show that the deal does not make them beholden to or 
controlled by the United States.  Their grand strategy includes improving the economy, 
gaining a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, formal recognition as a nuclear 
power, and settlement of regional issues such as the Kashmir dispute.  All of these goals 
can be furthered by a closer relationship with the United States, which provides a 
powerful incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and to be seen as a responsible power.    
b. Bharatiya Janata Party 
The BJP is the main opposition party to the INC.  It is a party strongly 
influenced by the spirit of nationalism and identification with the Hindu religion.  The 
BJP “views a strong relationship with the U.S. as essential to its plans for developing 
India and securing it from external threats.”144  Even with this view, the BJP opposes any 
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U.S. efforts, including the civilian nuclear deal, which they think puts too many 
constraints on Indian national power.  The BJP’s most recent foreign minister, Yashwant 
Singh, has criticized the nuclear deal as “giving America too much,” even as the deal is 
criticized in the U.S. as being heavily in favor of India.145  On another front important to 
the U.S., India and Iran are in talks to build a natural gas pipeline between the two 
countries.  The Bush administration is strongly against this project, but the BJP and the 
leftist parties support the pipeline because it is in “India’s own national interest.”146 
c. Communist Party and Leftist Allies 
The leftist parties consist of the Communist Party and three smaller parties 
encompassing 60 total votes in the People’s Assembly.  They, along with the INC, form 
the foundation for the ruling coalition in power.  The goals of the left can be summed up 
as the advancement of the common man through massive social outlays and an 
independent foreign policy.  As the swing vote on many issues, they have more power 
than their pure numbers might first suggest.  As evidence, they were able to block a set of 
economic reforms in 2005 when they derailed the Prime Minister’s plan to sell a number 
of state-owned companies.  They’ve also come out strongly against the civilian nuclear 
deal saying it “compromises India’s sovereignty and imposes American hegemony” and 
they have “threatened the government with ‘serious consequences’ if it did not give 
in.”147 
d. Views on PSI 
The INC government’s strong desire to counter terrorism makes it a  
supporter of cooperative nonproliferation efforts, but its nonaligned core view means it 
has to balance its desire to combat terrorism with the perception that it is aligning too 
closely with the United States.  This makes participation in predominately U.S.-led 
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initiatives, such as the PSI, more difficult than support of international regimes.  India 
initially declined to join the PSI due to perceptions that the two-tiered structure, 
consisting of the core group and the rest, discriminated against non-core group members.  
To ease this concern, the Bush administration disbanded the core group in 2005.  
However, India has still not joined the PSI.  Indian political journalist Raja Mohan thinks 
the reason behind this is that the “government appears frightened to cross the left which 
thinks the PSI is not in conformity with international law.”148  When the question is put 
to the military, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash stated the Indian Navy is 
ready and willing to participate in the “United States-sponsored PSI ‘provided the 
Government decides that it is in consonance with our national interest’ to do so.”149   
e. Views on CTR 
One of the original goals of the CTR program was to assist Russia in 
dismantling parts of its nuclear arsenal.  India exists in a regional power structure that 
would make it extremely difficult to convince it to dismantle its WMD.  The CTR 
expansion efforts most likely to succeed in India would be technology projects to assist it 
in securing its WMD arsenal.  The hurdle to this initiative is convincing the government 
that it is in its national interest to receive U.S. assistance.  India has a significant amount 
of national pride tied to its nuclear weapons program.  None of the political parties would 
want to lose prestige by publicly admitting they needed assistance securing either their 
weapons or material.  In addition, since they rely on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of 
regional security, they would be reluctant to take any action that might be interpreted by 
other regional actors as a weakness in their nuclear strike ability.  CRS researcher Sharon 
Squassoni nicely summarizes the difference between Russia and India:  
Threat reduction measures aimed at an outside/terrorist threat may conflict 
with nuclear deterrence.  For example, making materials and weapons safe 
from theft or espionage may logically lead to consolidating material and 
weapons at as few sites as possible.  However, that consolidation could 
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increase one’s vulnerability to a preemptive strike by an adversary.  In the 
case of Russia, the risk of a preemptive strike did not weigh into 
calculations of risk.  For India, however, the fear of a preemptive strike is 
prominent.150 
Given the difficulty the current coalition has had with lining up support for the civilian 
nuclear deal, it is unlikely Prime Minister Singh could back a deal giving the U.S. access 
to its most sensitive military sites for the purpose of upgrading security.  
f. Views on GTRI 
India participates in the part of the GTRI program that it is eligible for.  In 
its quest for recognition as a nuclear power, India wants to demonstrate that it is a 
responsible nuclear power.  It became a party to the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material in 2002 and its development of export controls and 
participation in the GTRI further enhance this image.  The conversion of a single research 
reactor allows India to claim participation in the program without cooperating to the 
degree which would raise domestic opposition.  India has several fast-breeder research 
reactors which have not been considered for conversion under the GTRI program.   
4. Interest Groups 
 Interest groups have the opportunity to influence the decision-making process in 
India’s democratic system.  The three interest groups examined in this section are: the 
military, the business community, and the executive agencies.    
a. The Military 
  The size of the Indian military exceeds one million and it is considered the 
dominant military force in South Asia.  The military has participated in many joint 
exercises with the U.S. over the last five years.  Despite this closer cooperation, CRS 
researcher Alan Kronstadt states: 
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Indian military officers voice frustration at what they see as inconsistent 
U.S. policies and lack of U.S. credibility.  Several have expressed concern 
that the U.S. is a ‘fickle’ partner that may not always be relied upon.151 
The Indian military desires a reliable and consistent supply of advanced technology 
items.  The military supports closer cooperation with the U.S. if it can gain access to 
better technology without the constraint of U.S. policy.  It sees itself as sufficiently 
capable to not need U.S. CTR assistance but supports the PSI effort.  It already provides 
maritime escorts to U.S. ships transiting the Straits of Malacca; further integration of 
maritime assets would be easily achievable.  
b. The Business Community 
  The size of India’s population makes continued economic expansion a 
priority for the government.  The Indian business community is strongly in favor of 
closer cooperation with the United States.  The U.S. is currently India’s largest export 
market with approximately $18 billion in exports to the United States in 2006.152  While 
the Indian business community supports cooperative ventures with the U.S., it most likely 
would reserve its lobbying efforts for economic-related initiatives instead 
nonproliferation-related ones.  The Indian nuclear industry is run by the state so the 
private business community would not have a strong motivation to support or hinder 
nonproliferation initiatives.   
c. The Executive Agencies 
  
The Department of Atomic Energy and India’s Nuclear Power Corp of 
India (NPCIL) are the primary agencies involved with nonproliferation.  India is 
projected to build more than 30 nuclear reactors to provide power to it growing economy.  
The U.S. estimates the build-out could generate U.S. business worth $100 billion by 
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2030.153  The energy agencies want the advanced technology and competitive bids an 
Indian-U.S. nuclear deal would bring and are strongly in favor of the deal.  However, 
they have been pushing hard to have the IAEA inspection requirements reduced as part of 
the final negotiation.  They would prefer not to have any IAEA inspections.154  This 
stance provides insight into how they view the CTR and GTRI programs.  These agencies 
do not desire any outside interference in their agencies and would not support CTR or 
GTRI programs which would interfere in the operation of their nuclear sites.  They would 
have no objection to the PSI since it would not impact their operations as they do not 
export WMD technology. 
5. The Public 
 The Indian government is elected by the people and thus must craft policies that 
engender public support.  Through expanded liberalization of the Indian economy, the 
government has expanded GDP by approximately 7% per year and reduced poverty by 10 
percentage points over the last decade.155  A major component of this economic success, 
produced by the large English-speaking population, is a significant boom in software and 
related service exports to the United States.  This influence can be seen in the 2007 Pew 
Global survey.  While the favorable view of the U.S. has declined since the start of the 
Iraq war, 59% of those surveyed still hold a favorable view of the United States.156  This 
favorable view of the U.S. should positively affect the efforts of the government when 
entering into cooperative agreements with the United States.  However, as the nonaligned 
views of the ruling party are also reflected in the views of the population, any cooperative 
nonproliferation agreements would have to be perceived as having a negligible impact on 
India’s independence.   
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6. Conclusion 
 In India, the domestic politics variable does appear to have a strong influence on 
the decision to cooperate with the U.S. in nonproliferation efforts.  There are many 
reasons for India to participate in the PSI, from a strategic interest to prevent proliferation 
to the benefits of solidifying a closer relationship to the United States.  However, despite 
the ruling party’s desire to form a closer relationship with the U.S., as evidenced by the 
negotiation of the civilian nuclear power deal, they face considerable resistance from 
parties that fear India will become a stooge of the United States.  It appears the main 
reason India’s INC dominant government has not joined the PSI is due to a concession to 
its coalition leftist partner along with the opposition of the BJP.  The case isn’t so clear 
for the CTR.  India’s status as a nuclear weapon state outside of the NPT creates legal 
difficulties which currently overshadow any possible CTR effort.  Additionally, it is not 
apparent India would be interested in any form of CTR assistance due to the national 
prestige they have tied to their nuclear weapon program.  This analysis of the domestic 
situation does lend support to the role of international institutions in the decision to 
cooperate.  The perception of being nonaligned would more easily be compatible with 
cooperative nonproliferation efforts if these efforts were headed by an international 
institution instead of mainly backed by the United States.  Given the national view on 
counterterrorism, the opposition to cooperation in efforts like the PSI would be greatly 
weakened if they were not viewed as U.S.-led initiatives. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter examined the domestic political situations in Russia, China, and 
India to see how much influence this variable had on cooperation with the U.S. in the 
CTR, GTRI, and PSI programs.  The results were mixed with the domestic politics 
variable influencing the decision to cooperate in the cases of China and India but 
appearing to have little effect in Russia.  In all three cases, a necessary condition to 
cooperation in nonproliferation programs was that cooperation had to be in the national 
interest of the country.  This seems fairly intuitive, as cooperation is a method of 
voluntarily influencing another country as opposed to other strategies such as coercion or 
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compellence.  A state would not voluntarily participate in an initiative unless it furthered 
its grand strategy.  In the case of India, cooperation in the CTR program does not 
currently align with its grand strategy of gaining recognition as a nuclear power.  Finally, 
there is evidence that the involvement of international institutions influences the decision 
to cooperate in nonproliferation programs.  In all three cases, the involvement of an 
international institution positively impacted the decision to cooperate.  In the cases of 
China and India, the two countries that have decided not to participate in the PSI, the 
evidence suggests that the involvement of an international organization might be the 
difference between cooperation or not.  For these two countries, one of the barriers to 
cooperation is the fact that the PSI is perceived as a U.S.-led initiative, which has 
negative domestic repercussions that would likely be absent if the PSI were seen as the 
product of an international institution.  Additionally, in the cases of Russia and China, the 
desire for inclusion in international economic organizations provided an incentive to 
cooperate.  These states wish to be seen as responsible powers to further their integration 
into the international economy.  Supporting global nonproliferation norms and activities 



































  This chapter reviews the research results regarding why states cooperate in 
nonproliferation activities and the implications of this research for U.S. foreign policy 
options.  The first part of this chapter analyzes the hypotheses presented in Chapter I 
using both the quantitative results from Chapter III and the qualitative results from 
Chapter IV.  The results show support for some hypotheses while clearly not supporting 
others.  The second part of the chapter looks at strategies the U.S. might employ to 
increase cooperation in nonproliferation programs. 
B. EXPLAINING COOPERATION IN NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS 
This thesis examined three international level variables and two domestic level 
variables which, based on IR theory, might be expected to influence international 
cooperation in nonproliferation programs.  These variables were used to form the 
hypotheses tested in Chapters III and IV.  These hypotheses related to: linking 
cooperation with security assistance; whether alliances could predict cooperation; 
whether involvement in international organizations positively influenced cooperation; the 
economic freedom of a state; and the role of domestic politics in the decision to 
cooperate.  The evidence showed mixed degrees of support for the different variables. 
1. No Support for Hypotheses 
a. Alliance Hypothesis 
There was no empirical or case study support for the alliance hypothesis.  
Realist balance of power theory predicted states would be more likely to cooperate with 
the U.S. if they were an ally.  If this theory had held, we should have seen greater 
cooperation among allied states than among non-allied states.  While there was some 
early indication of this in the descriptive statistics for the PSI program, it did not prove to 
be statistically significant.  Both the PSI and GTRI programs have fairly high global 
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participation.  This might indicate participation in these programs transcends balance of 
power politics.  Another possibility is that balance of power logic is still at work but is 
functioning through informal state alliances with the U.S. against global terrorism.   
The CTR program includes only a small number of countries and was 
originally focused on states the U.S. opposed during the cold war.  Even with the end of 
the cold war, none of the states participating in the CTR program were U.S. allies at the 
time the agreements were enacted.  The fact that a state is a formal ally of the U.S. does 
not tell us much about the level of cooperation in nonproliferation programs.  
b. Economic Freedom 
  The second hypothesis with no quantitative or qualitative support 
suggested that the likelihood of cooperation would increase as economic freedom scores 
increased.  The theory behind this predicted economic interest groups and the 
government would both be more likely to support international cooperation as the 
economy opened up and became more interdependent with the rest of the world.  If this 
theory held, we should have seen little cooperation from states with low EF scores.  
However, some of the countries with the lowest EF scores, such as Libya and Syria 
participated in the GTRI and several states with relatively low scores, such as Russia and 
the Ukraine, participated in all three of the nonproliferation programs examined in the 
study.  Our theory did hold at the high end as the top five highest-scoring states 
participated in both the PSI and GTRI programs.  Overall, the evidence indicates there is 
no meaningful correlation between economic freedom scores and the likelihood a state 
will cooperate with the U.S. in areas of nonproliferation.   
Although there is no connection between the openness of the economy and 
nonproliferation cooperation, there appears to be a connection between political elites’ 
desire to further integrate their state into the global economy and international 
cooperation.  The desire to join international economic organizations provides an 
incentive to support international nonproliferation norms and to be seen as a responsible 
power.  
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c. Security Assistance 
  There was little evidence supporting our hypothesis linking security 
assistance to cooperation in nonproliferation programs.  IR theory suggests the U.S. could 
impose its will on another state to coerce cooperation through the linkage of security 
assistance with the decision to cooperate.  A state that did not cooperate would face the 
possibility of having its security assistance cut off.  If this theory held, states receiving 
large amounts of assistance would cooperate rather than lose the assistance.  Applying 
this theory to nonproliferation resulted in little support for security assistance issue 
linkage.  States receiving small amounts of security assistance, like China and Vietnam, 
participated in the GTRI while states receiving large amounts of security assistance, such 
as Egypt, Pakistan, and South Korea, all receiving in excess of $2 billion a year, did not 
cooperate in the PSI.  Whether it is the case of the receiving country not bowing to the 
threat, or more likely, the U.S. not making the threat to begin with for other geopolitical 
reasons, security assistance does not seem to influence the decision to cooperate. 
2. Moderate Support for Hypotheses 
a. International Organizations  
  There was solid evidence supporting the hypothesis on international 
organizations.  Our theory predicted increasing cooperation as state involvement in 
international institutions increased.  A host of reasons, ranging from the fact that 
international institutions lower transaction costs and make reciprocity more likely to 
increased legitimacy, form the foundation of this theory.157  If this theory works in the 
area of nonproliferation, there should be more cooperation from states heavily involved 
with international organizations than those only marginally involved.  There were mixed 
quantitative results for this hypothesis.  In the PSI model, this was the only hypothesis 
supported with statistically significant results.  However, the results were not statistically 
significant when the data was tested in the GTRI model.  The mixed statistical results 
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might indicate a fundamental difference in the PSI and GTRI programs which 
necessitates breaking them out from the nonproliferation umbrella.    
  In addition to the quantitative evidence, there was moderate case study 
evidence supporting the role of international organizations in the decision to cooperate.  
In these cases, the legitimacy conferred by a prominent international organization, like 
the United Nations, overseeing the program would increase the appeal of cooperation.  In 
the cases of both China and India, one of the main reasons neither country supported the 
PSI is due to its close association with the United States.  International institutional 
sponsorship of this program would decrease the negative domestic consequences of 
supporting a U.S.-centric initiative and thus increase the chances of cooperation.  
In all three of the case studies, the states are trying to increase their global 
and regional influence.  All three states want to be seen as responsible world powers.  
Russia wants admission to the WTO, China wants to increase its soft power, and India 
wants acceptance as a nuclear power as well as a permanent seat on the U.N. Security 
Council.  Cooperating in international organizations and upholding international norms 
are requirements for gaining responsible power status.  China, in particular, has a history 
of only supporting nonproliferation efforts after they have become global norms.  U.N. 
backing for programs such as the PSI would accelerate the acceptance of 
counterproliferation as a global norm and would increase the levels of cooperation in the 
program. 
b. Domestic Politics 
  The results of the international organization variable correspond well with 
the domestic politics hypothesis.  There was moderate case study support for the role 
domestic politics play in the decision to cooperate in nonproliferation programs.  This 
was the only hypothesis not statistically tested.  Of the three cases examined, domestic 
politics played a role in influencing the decision to cooperate in the cases of China and 
India but not in the case of Russia.  In India, a delicate ruling coalition exists which has 
mixed feelings about close cooperation with the United States.  The opposition vocally 
objects to any cooperative efforts which might put India unduly under the influence of the 
U.S. and it is supported by elements of the ruling coalition.  This alignment of domestic 
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political parties makes cooperating with U.S. initiatives difficult.  The fact that the PSI 
aligns very closely with Indian national strategy gives further support to the significance 
of both international institutions and domestic politics.  The opposition’s argument 
against the PSI rests mostly against aligning India too closely with the United States.  If 
the PSI program were a U.N. initiative, the argument would be nullified and domestic 
opposition to the program would be significantly reduced.  
  In the case of China, there is similar domestic pressure against cooperation 
with the United States.  Chinese pressure comes not from different political parties but 
from the public.  The Chinese government has used feelings of nationalism to stay in 
power and they have directed these emotions against the U.S. by manipulating the media.  
The Chinese cannot maintain anti-U.S. propaganda and then be seen to closely cooperate 
with U.S. security initiatives.  Like India, this pressure would be significantly reduced if 
the PSI were an internationally sponsored program and not seen as a U.S. initiative.  The 
China case study support for this hypothesis is slightly weaker than the Indian support 
because the goals of nonproliferation do not line up as closely with Chinese grand 
strategy as they do with Indian grand strategy. 
3. Additional Findings 
 The empirical analysis and case studies focused on the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter I.  However, in the process of researching these variables, some further themes 
arose that deserve comment.  In conjunction with the alliance variable, the timing at 
which states cooperate merits further research.  At the point in time which the data for the 
dependent variables was analyzed, both the PSI and GTRI had numerous participants.  As 
the number of participants grows, a bandwagoning effect might be seen that further 
increases cooperation.  Allies might play a key role in gaining an initial base of support 
for cooperative nonproliferation initiatives.  Other factors included the use of financial 
assistance and the national interests of the target state. 
a. Financial Assistance 
  The variable security assistance provided the only means to measure the 
potential effects of an incentive-type payment to influence a state towards cooperation.  
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However, this variable includes foreign military sales and thus is not a great proxy for 
measuring the effect of financial incentives on cooperation.  In the case of Russia, there is 
strong evidence that the financial incentives associated with the CTR program played a 
major role in achieving Russian cooperation.  In the 1990s, when the CTR program was 
created, Russia was experiencing severe financial hardship and could not afford to 
maintain the military structure created during the cold war.  The money provided through 
the CTR program gave Russia a means to secure its strategic forces and some breathing 
room to get its economy straightened out.  The dire circumstances in Russia and the offer 
of U.S. assistance gave Russia the incentive to cooperate with its former cold war 
adversary.  Although this example might not be applicable to most states, its important to 
note that financial incentives can provide a powerful motivation to cooperate under the 
right circumstances.   
  Another situation where financial assistance might play a role occurs in 
states that have neither a strong motivation for or against an initiative.  In the case of 
China, it does not view nuclear terrorism as nearly as great of a threat as does the United 
States.  Therefore, it sees no need to allocate scarce state resources to convert civilian 
research reactors from HEU to LEU.  It is not against this but it is just not high enough on 
the priority list to get funded.  In cases such as this, the externally funded GTRI program 
provides the financial incentive to cooperate.  By cooperating, the Chinese gain the 
advantage of having a low-priority threat eliminated and it does not cost them anything to 
do it.  These two cases provide evidence that financial incentives can tip the balance 
between cooperation and not.  The use of a more direct financial payment to “buy” 
cooperation might also be a way to influence the decision to cooperate and provides a 
question for possible further research. 
b. Grand Strategy/National Interest 
  A state’s grand strategy plays an important role in its decision to 
cooperate.  While this is fairly intuitive, it is important to note the role strategy, or 
national interest, plays in the decision to cooperate.  The evidence suggests that national 
interest is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cooperation.  In other words, 
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before cooperation can occur, the nonproliferation effort must align with the overall 
strategy of the states involved.  No variable will entice cooperation if it is first not in the 
interest of the state involved to promote nonproliferation.  In the case of India, it is not in 
its national interest to receive U.S. assistance securing its nuclear arsenal.  The benefits of 
upgrading security do not outweigh the perceived costs of admitting it needs U.S. help to 
secure its weapons and to opening up these sites.  Therefore, even though India could 
benefit from several of the CTR programs, it will not cooperate out of a fear this will 
show a weakness in its capabilities.    
  
C. STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE COOPERATION 
 The United States currently uses many tools to influence international cooperation 
in nonproliferation programs.  These tools include diplomatic pressure as well as positive 
and negative issue linkage.  The number of participants in the GTRI and the PSI attest to 
the effectiveness of these tactics.  As a superpower, the U.S. has the means to convince 
numerous states to cooperate in international efforts.  In addition, nonproliferation is in 
the national interest of most states, which lowers the barrier to achieving cooperation.  
The research in this thesis suggests focusing efforts on international organizations and a 
state’s domestic politics, supplemented by selective use of economic incentives, as a 
means to further increase cooperation in nonproliferation programs. 
1. Going International  
The Bush administration has a preference towards unilateralism and a dislike for 
international bureaucracy, which has heavily shaped the current methods of influencing 
cooperation.  While the U.S. does engage multilaterally, with the EU and the U.N. to 
name some examples, it is clear the favorite policy option is to use bilateral agreements 
as the means of gaining cooperation in nonproliferation programs.  Although bilateral 
programs have achieved a certain amount of success to date, the key to further expanding 
cooperation in nonproliferation programs lies in multilateral efforts.  The research in this 
thesis points to the use of international institutions as the most effective means of 
increasing international cooperation.  The states not currently cooperating, some of 
 92
whose participation is vital to our long-term efforts, have the ability and incentives to 
resist cooperation in U.S.-centric programs.  Only through multilateral initiatives can the 
United States break down the barriers currently impeding cooperation.  A program such 
as the PSI should be established as a formal agreement under an international 
organization such as the U.N. or the IAEA.  The organization would have to be funded 
and fully supported by intelligence and military assets to be effective.  The force on 
standby for counterproliferation missions could be composed in a similar manner to a 
U.N. peacekeeping force.  For the U.S., there would be both costs and benefits attached 
to this type of organization. 
 The costs of making nonproliferation programs truly multilateral reside mostly 
from the constraints such an action would put on the use of U.S. power.  If the PSI were 
managed by an international organization, the U.S. would lose the ability to act 
unilaterally and might not be able to convince an international body of the necessity to 
interdict a particular vessel.  In a multilateral organization, the intelligence required to 
kick off an interdiction would likely have to be of higher quality due to the need to 
convince more than one party of the necessity for action.  The new organization would 
also succumb to some bureaucratic inertia which might reduce the effectiveness and 
flexibility of the initiative.  Last of all, a multilateral effort would have to follow the rule 
of law and treat all parties equally.  This could hamper U.S. efforts to target specific 
states.   
 The benefits of transitioning nonproliferation programs from U.S. control to an 
international institution are many and seem to outweigh the costs.  As shown in this 
thesis, international organizations have a greater ability to positively influence 
cooperation.  Many of the negatives currently used to justify not cooperating would be 
eliminated.  These include the following perceptions that: these programs are tools to 
increase U.S. power; the programs are unfair and targeted at certain states; and the 
programs are aimed at decreasing global competition in the civilian nuclear industry.  
Internationalizing the efforts would also go a long way towards further solidifying 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation as global norms.  Once these concepts are 
norms, the international community will positively reinforce good behavior and punish 
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violators.  Finally, a robust international coalition will provide the commitment needed to 
create a strong deterrent effect to would-be proliferators.  
2. Leveraging Domestic Politics 
 Another option the U.S. can use to increase international cooperation is to further 
develop foreign policy programs designed to influence domestic politics in a particular 
state.  This is not a new concept but it is difficult to implement, especially in the more 
closed societies such as China.  However, the case studies provide evidence that this 
“back-door” method of influencing state behavior has worth.  In Chapter I, the concept of 
soft power was defined.  The same types of programs recommended to increase soft 
power, such as educational exchanges, cultural outreach, and humanitarian programs, like 
HIV/Aids assistance and the Peace Corps, can increase the attractiveness of the United 
States to foreign populations.  As our attractiveness grows, it will be easier for domestic 
coalitions favoring cooperation with the U.S. to gain traction; domestic opposition to U.S. 
efforts should diminish.  Related to this, the U.S. needs to commit more resources to a 
public image campaign.  The U.S. does a lot of good things but it does little to improve 
our attractiveness if nobody knows about them or the good efforts are overshadowed by 
negative press. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The United States is engaged on many fronts to oppose terrorism and increase our 
national security.  Of these, the nonproliferation efforts to prevent terrorists from 
acquiring WMD are some of the most important.  Our current efforts have influenced a 
large number of states to participate in programs aimed at preventing WMD proliferation.  
However, in a globalized and interdependent world, the U.S. needs to further increase 
this coalition and strengthen the global norms against proliferation.  This study lends 
support to the important role international institutions play in influencing cooperation.  
The U.S. needs to move toward multilateral cooperative programs to positively influence 
states to collaborate in nonproliferation programs.  Likely, the best course going forward 
involves moving towards international regimes while still implementing unilateral 
foreign policy initiatives tailored towards the specific states we are trying to influence.  
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With these efforts, the U.S. can further decrease the probability of a terrorist using WMD 
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